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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the conditions
under which students in high school can be punished for their speech
and, in addition, has analyzed a couple of cases in which university
students were dismissed from professional programs for academic
reasons. But the Court has said relatively little about whether or how
to use the high school student speech jurisprudence in the university
context and about whether or how to apply the academic dismissal
jurisprudence in other kinds of contexts. The Court’s reticence on
these matters is unfortunate because lower courts have been forced to
address the constitutionality of different kinds of university student
dismissals without necessary guidance from the Court.
Several courts have addressed the conditions under which
students may be dismissed from professional programs for
unprofessional comments or practices. These courts’ approaches have
varied with respect to both the appropriate test to use and how
particular tests should be applied. The Court’s failure to give more
than minimal direction on these matters has resulted in dissimilar
†
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treatment of relevantly similar cases—a trend that will only continue
until the Court provides some greatly needed guidance.
Part I of this Article discusses the Court’s student-speech and
academic-dismissal jurisprudence, explaining some of the difficulties in
providing a coherent account of what the Court has said. Part II
discusses some of the cases arising in the lower courts, noting how
those decisions do not cohere well with the approaches taken by other
courts or, sometimes, by the Supreme Court. The Article concludes by
predicting that the confusion and inconsistency in this area will continue to grow until the Court offers a coherent account specifying not
only which principle is applicable but how that principle should be
applied.

I. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the conditions
under which schools can punish students for their speech without
thereby offending First Amendment guarantees. Regrettably, that
jurisprudence is murky at best. The Court has also addressed due
process concerns in university academic dismissals, but those cases
offer little or no guidance with respect to First Amendment
protections of students dismissed for unprofessional comments or
activities. The current jurisprudence on university students’ rights in
the context of dismissals from professional programs is largely
unchartered, creating uncertainties and risks for students and
universities alike.
A. Student Speech Rights in Secondary Schools

The Court has issued several decisions involving the First Amendment rights of high school students. At first, student-speech
protections seemed relatively robust, although later decisions weakened those guarantees in not clearly defined ways. In addition, the
Court has offered some limited guidance with respect to due process
issues raised in the context of university student dismissals for
academic reasons. Those cases provide universities and students with
much too little guidance. In short, the Supreme Court has provided
almost no guidance with respect to the proper approach to
determining whether student dismissals from professional programs
violate constitutional guarantees.
The seminal case in the Court’s student speech rights
jurisprudence is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,1 which involved students who wore black armbands to their
1.

	
  

393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Raul R. Calvoz et al., Cyber Bullying and Free Speech:
Striking an Age-Appropriate Balance, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 357, 364 (2013)
(discussing “the Court’s seminal student speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines”);
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schools to protest the Vietnam War.2 The students were sent home
and suspended until willing to attend school without the armbands.3
The schools’ actions were challenged in federal court.4
The Tinker Court recognized that “First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,
are available to teachers and students.”5 Wearing armbands in school
is “closely akin to ‘pure speech.’”6 In this case, the “silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on
the part of petitioners” neither interfered “with the schools’ work” nor
adversely affected “the rights of other students to be secure and to be
let alone.”7 While a few students made hostile comments to the
protesters, “there were no threats or acts of violence on school premises.”8
The district court upheld the school’s actions,9 reasoning that “the
action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based
upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands.”10
But the Court rejected that an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension
of disturbance is . . . enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression.”11
The authorities’ disagreement with the message alone was not
enough to justify its suppression. “In order for the State in the person
Thomas E. Wheeler II, Lessons from the Lord of the Flies: Protecting Students
from Internet Threats and Cyber Hate Speech, 10 J. Internet L. 3, 4 (2006)
(“Any examination of student free speech rights under the First Amendment
must necessarily start with the seminal Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.”); Lindsay J. Gower, Blue
Mountain School District v. J.S. Ex Rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court
Provide Clarification for Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet
Speech?, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 709, 710 (2013) (“Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District is the seminal case for student free speech rights.”).
2.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (“On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher
[Eckhardt] wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his
armband the next day.”). Other unnamed students also wore the armbands.
See id. at 508 (“[F]ive students were suspended for wearing them.”).

3.

Id. at 504.

4.

Id.

5.

Id. at 506.

6.

Id. at 505.

7.

Id. at 508.

8.

Id.

9.

Id. at 504–05.

10.

Id. at 508.

11.

Id.
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of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”12 The
Court inferred that the school authorities had “an urgent wish to
avoid the controversy which might result from the expression,”13 but
the mere desire to remain uncontroversial could not justify the
limitation on political speech.
A brief examination of the school’s practices made them even
more constitutionally suspect. The school had not adopted a uniform
policy with respect to the expression of political views as a general
matter.14 On the contrary, “students in some of the schools wore
buttons relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore
the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism.”15 At least in part
because the school’s prohibition did not include other political
messages16 but, instead, “a particular symbol—black armbands worn
to exhibit opposition to this Nation’s involvement in Vietnam—was
singled out for prohibition,”17 the Court held that the school
authorities’ actions violated constitutional guarantees.18
In striking down the school authorities’ actions, the Tinker Court
was not thereby permitting students to prevent the schools from
performing their mission. The Court expressly noted that the
protesting students “neither interrupted school activities nor sought
to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others.”19 While leaving
open how much actual or probable disruption would be required
before a school suspension for student expression would be upheld, the
Court nonetheless implied that the Constitution offered significant
protection for students. Absent a “showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school,’ the prohibition [could not] be sustained.”20
12.

Id. at 509.

13.

Id. at 510.

14.

Id. (“[T]he school authorities did not purport to prohibit the wearing of all
symbols of political or controversial significance.”).

15.

Id.

16.

Id. (“The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did not extend to
these.”).

17.

Id. at 510–11.

18.

Id. at 514.

19.

Id.

20.

Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
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Subsequent case law suggests that protections of student speech
may be less robust than the Tinker disruption standard implies.
Bethel School District v. Fraser21 involved the punishment of a
student for a nominating speech that, in the words of the majority,
was “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”22 Prior to
its delivery, he had shown his speech to teachers who had “informed
him that the speech was ‘inappropriate and that he probably should
not deliver it.’”23 In addition, he had been warned that “his delivery of
the speech might have ‘severe consequences.’”24 The speech included
the following:
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his
shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you,
the students of Bethel, is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If
necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing
until finally—he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for
each and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come
between you and the best our high school can be.25

Justice Brennan rejected that the speech was as offensive as one
might have inferred from the Court’s description of it,26 although he
nonetheless believed that the speech was punishable:
[I]in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high
school students how to conduct civil and effective public
discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational
activities, it was not unconstitutional for school officials to
21.

478 U.S. 675 (1986).

22.

Id. at 678.

23.

Id.

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring).

26.

Id. (“The Court, referring to these remarks as ‘obscene,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘lewd,’ and
‘offensively lewd,’ concludes that school officials properly punished respondent
for uttering the speech. Having read the full text of respondent’s remarks, I
find it difficult to believe that it is the same speech the Court describes.”).
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conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent’s
remarks exceeded permissible limits.27

A school counselor described some of the student reactions to the
speech: “Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures
graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in
respondent’s speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and
embarrassed by the speech.”28 But there had been testimony that the
disruption at this assembly was no greater than usual,29 and the fact
that three out of the 600 attending students made sexually suggestive
movements did not amount to a disruption of the educational
process.30
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the Tinker material-disruption standard had not been
met.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
school’s actions violated constitutional guarantees.32
When reviewing the Ninth Circuit decision holding that Fraser’s
speech was protected,33 the Court had a few options. It could have affirmed, recognizing that the Tinker material-disruption test had not
been met. If, instead, the Supreme Court was going to reverse the
Ninth Circuit decision, it either had to suggest that the Tinker
disruption standard had been misapplied below and in fact had been
met, or decide that student speech was not immune from punishment
even if the Tinker standard had not been met.
The Fraser Court chose the last approach, chastising the Ninth
Circuit for not recognizing the “marked distinction between the
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content
of respondent’s speech.”34 In what might be described as a lesson in
civility, the Court suggested that while there must be “tolerance of
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed
may be unpopular,”35 speakers must “take into account
27.

Id. at 687–88.

28.

Id. at 678 (majority opinion).

29.

Id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

30.

Id.

31.

Id. at 693.

32.

Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 474 U.S. 814 (1985).

33.

Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985),
rev’d, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (“[W]e hold that the First Amendment prohibited
the District from punishing Fraser for making a speech that school officials
considered to be ‘indecent.’”).

34.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.

35.

Id. at 681.
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consideration . . . , in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow
students.”36 Without exploring the constitutional parameters of the
announced approach, the Court explained that the “freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”37
One difficulty raised by the Court’s discussion of balancing unpopular views against socially appropriate behavior is that the Court
left open when that balancing should occur. One interpretation of
Fraser is that this balancing only takes place when the speech
involves sexual innuendo rather than political speech.38 But a different
interpretation is that balancing is appropriate as a general matter,39
and Fraser simply illustrates that lewd or indecent speech will not be
weighed heavily in the balance.40
A separate issue involves determining what constitutes socially
appropriate behavior. The Court understood that there might well be
disagreement about that, and suggested that the best approach was to
defer to the judgment of school authorities. “The determination of
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board.”41 For example, “it
36.

Id.

37.

Id.

38.

See Shannon L. Doering, Tinkering with School Discipline in the Name of
the First Amendment: Expelling A Teacher’s Ability to Proactively Quell
Disruptions Caused by Cyberbullies at the Schoolhouse, 87 Neb. L. Rev.
630, 646 (2009) (“Fraser struck the balance in favor of protecting the
rights of others and decorum within the school, and against affording
First Amendment protection to speech of such little social value as
Fraser’s speech.”); see also Kimbrilee M. Weber, Note, Banning
‘Boobies’?: A Standard for School Districts to Evaluate Plausibly Lewd,
on-Campus Student Speech in Light of B.H. Ex Rel. Hawk v. Easton Area
School District, 45 Seton Hall L. Rev. 647, 652 (2015) (“Fraser is
significant because it limits Tinker’s broad rule of permissibility and gives
more power to school districts to ban or prevent student First
Amendment speech that is classified as lewd.”); Jonathan Pyle, Speech in
Public Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 586, 618 (2002) (“Justice Burger also suggested in Fraser that
a balancing test limits students’ freedom to engage in low-value speech.”).

39.

See Ari Ezra Waldman, All Those Like You: Identity Aggression and
Student Speech, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 653, 678 (2012) (“Bethel School District
v. Fraser[] helps clarify the Court’s underlying balancing test in student
speech cases.”).

40.

Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v.
Frederick, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 657, 681 (2009) (“[I]t is clear
that ‘lewd and indecent’ speech is not protected, as determined by
Fraser.”).

41.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
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is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”42
The Court did not limit the reach of its comments to speech involving “sexual innuendo,”43 suggesting that vulgar speech included
more than that.44 Indeed, “offensive terms in public discourse”45 might
include speech that is neither lewd nor indecent.
Years earlier, the Court noted in Street v. New York46 that “under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers.”47 However, the Street Court was not addressing offensive
school speech, and the Fraser Court rejected that “simply because the
use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults
making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude
must be permitted to children in a public school.” 48 Precisely because
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”49 the
Fraser Court suggested that the Constitution permitted a more
robust limitation on student speech than merely a prohibition of
sexually laden communications.
The Fraser opinion is not a model of clarity with respect to the
kind of school speech that can be prohibited.50 What made the opinion
even more confusing was the Court’s repeated referrals to Fraser’s inappropriate conduct rather than speech.51 Traditionally, First
42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 678.

44.

See id. at 684–85 (suggesting that speech about excretory functions might
also be prohibited); see also Derek Ruzicka, It’s Political, You Can’t Be
Offended! A Discussion of the Student Speech Analysis in Guiles Ex Rel.
Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006), 32 S. Ill. U. L.J. 469,
472 (2008) (“The Court concluded the sexual content in Fraser’s address
constituted lewd, vulgar, and plainly offensive speech. However it did not
limit those terms to speech of a sexual nature.”).

45.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.

46.

394 U.S. 576 (1969).

47.

Id. at 592.

48.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.

49.

Id.

50.

Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in
Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1282, 1302 (2008) (“Chief
Justice Burger’s Fraser opinion . . . [is] not considered a model of
clarity.”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (“The
mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”).

51.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (“Fraser was presented with copies of five letters
submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was
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Amendment speech protections are more robust than are such
protections for expressive conduct,52 and constitutional protections for
expressive conduct are more robust than are constitutional protections
for non-expressive conduct.53 But Fraser had done nothing other than
give the speech—there was no allegation, for example, that Fraser had
been among the students making the sexually suggestive movements.54
It is unclear, then, if the Court’s reference to Fraser’s conduct had
some doctrinal importance55 or, instead, was simply a way to capture
why Fraser’s nominating speech violated the schools disruptive
conduct rule.56

given a chance to explain his conduct.”); id. at 680 (“The Court of
Appeals read [Tinker] as precluding any discipline of Fraser for indecent
speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly.”); id. at 683 (“The
schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that
indulged in by this confused boy.”); id. at 685–86 (“[I]t was perfectly
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the
pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the
‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”); id. at 686 (discussing
“the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide
range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process”).
52.

See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in
restricting the written or spoken word.”) (citing United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).

53.

Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1,
12 (2016) (“[T]he distinction between expressive and non-expressive
conduct is absolutely crucial; restrictions of nonexpressive conduct do not
implicate the First Amendment at all.”).

54.

Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (“During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, a school
counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students
hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual
activities pointedly alluded to in respondent’s speech.”).

55.

See, e.g., Charles J. Russo & Floyd G. Delon, Warning: Student
Expressive Activities and Assignments May Be Hazardous to Their
Teachers’ Employment Health, 132 Ed. L. Rep. 595, 603 n.46 (1999)
(suggesting that “Fraser focused on the authority of school officials to
regulate the expressive conduct of students”).

56.

See Robert Block, Students’ Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the
Public Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 35 DePaul L.
Rev. 739, 751 (1986) (noting that “[t]he day after the speech, the
assistant principal of Bethel High School charged Fraser with violating the
school’s disruptive conduct rule”).
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Fraser can be read either57 as modifying Tinker in that it adopted
a balancing approach to student speech58 or as providing an exception
to Tinker.59 In subsequent cases, the Court made the applicable jurisprudence more confusing rather than less.
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,60 the Court examined
a principal’s decision to excise articles from the school newspaper.61
One of the articles of concern discussed some of the high school
students’ experiences with pregnancy,62 while another discussed “the
impact of divorce on students at the school.”63 Reynolds, the
principal, worried that the students who had been pregnant were
identifiable, even though their names had not been included in the
article.64 In addition, he believed that a discussion of sexual activity
and birth control was inappropriate for some of the younger
students.65 The article concerning divorce contained some negative
57.

Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the
Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions—For
the Law and for the Litigants, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1407, 1425 (2011)
(“Fraser’s various ill-explained rationales made it a Rorschach precedent,
viewable as either distinguishing or undercutting Tinker.”).

58.

Andrew D. M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54
Baylor L. Rev. 623, 631 (2002) (“[T]he Court refused to apply Tinker’s
substantial and material interference test and instead employed a type of
balancing test.”).

59.

See Joyce Dindo, The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a
Drug Exception or a Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 Cap. U.
L. Rev. 201, 205 (2008) (“This exception permits principals and school
administrators to limit student speech that is ‘vulgar and lewd.’”); Abby
Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial
Student Speech, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1501, 1509 (2008)
(“Fraser . . . established a distinct standard apart from Tinker.”); Piotr
Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference,
and Confusion Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1059, 1066
(2009) (“[I]n Fraser, the Court shied away from the permissive Tinker
standard and carved out an exception to Tinker based on lewd, indecent, and
offensive speech.”).

60.

484 U.S. 260 (1988).

61.

Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The school principal, without prior
consultation or explanation, excised six articles—comprising two full pages—
of the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum. He did so not because any of the
articles would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline,’ but simply because he considered two of the six
‘inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable’ for student consumption.”).

62.

Id. at 263 (majority opinion).

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

106

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the Constitution

characterizations of one parent,66 and the parents had not been
afforded an opportunity to consent or respond.67 The end of the
school year was approaching, and Principal Reynolds believed that
there simply was not enough time to both edit the articles and to
print the issue.68 He simply decided not to print the two pages
containing the worrisome articles.69
Three students who had been on the newspaper subsequently
sued, claiming that their First Amendment rights had been
abridged.70 The Eighth Circuit held that because the school
newspaper was a public forum71 and because the deleted articles, if
published, would not have made the school potentially liable in
tort,72 the students’ First Amendment rights had been abridged
when those two pages were deleted.73
Citing Fraser, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting
that “the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools
‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings,’”74 and that a “school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”75
The Court cited Fraser for the proposition that schools need not
tolerate speech inconsistent with the school’s mission, which seems
to afford schools much greater leeway than merely the power to
prohibit student use of “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech.”76
The Kuhlmeier Court rejected that the newspaper was a public
forum,77 in part because the school authorities had not “‘by policy or
66.

Id. (“Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the
divorce story had complained that her father ‘wasn’t spending enough
time with my mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always out
of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always
argued about everything’ with her mother.”).

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at 263–64.

69.

Id. at 264.

70.

Id. at 262.

71.

Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

72.

Id. at 1376.

73.

Id. at 1370.

74.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).

75.

Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).

76.

Id. at 266–67 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).

77.

Id. at 269–70.
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by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the
general public.’”78 Because school authorities had instead “‘reserve[d]
the forum for its intended purpos[e],’ as a supervised learning
experience for journalism students . . . , school officials were entitled
to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner.”79
Given that it was reasonableness, “rather than [the Court’s] decision
in Tinker, that governs this case,”80 the Court’s holding that “no
violation of First Amendment rights occurred”81 was unsurprising.
The Kuhlmeier Court distinguished Tinker by noting that the
“question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate
particular student speech—the question that we addressed in
Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student
speech.”82 This case involved “‘educators’ authority over schoolsponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”83 The
student newspaper was appropriately “characterized as part of the
school curriculum . . . [because] supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences.”84 But students do not have the right to
say whatever they want in class, for example, offer a presentation on
material unrelated to the course. Even professors do not have an
unfettered First Amendment right to determine what is covered in a
course.85
After explaining that the school newspaper was more
appropriately thought of as a part of the curriculum rather than a
kind of public forum, the Court discussed the kind of deference that
should be given to educators instead of students. “Educators are
entitled to exercise greater control over . . . [the curriculum] to assure
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to
teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may
78.

Id. at 270 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460
U.S. 37, 47 (1983)).

79.

Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46).

80.

Id.

81.

Id. at 276.

82.

Id. at 270–71.

83.

Id. at 271.

84.

Id.

85.

See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]
public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to
decide what will be taught in the classroom.”).
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be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”86
This greater control gives schools wide latitude. For example,
a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper
or producer of a school play “disassociate itself,” not only from
speech that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . or
impinge upon the rights of other students,” but also from speech
that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written,
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane,
or unsuitable for immature audiences.87

Once again, the Court suggested that the normal rules regarding
the regulation of speech in society at large are distinguishable from
the rules that are appropriate in the school context. For example, a
“school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that
is disseminated under its auspices—standards that may be higher
than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical
producers in the ‘real’ world—and may refuse to disseminate student
speech that does not meet those standards.”88 Not only are schools
permitted to refuse to publish speech that does not meet their own
“high standards,”89 but they “retain the authority to refuse to sponsor
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug
or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent
with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order’ . . . .”90 The
Kuhlmeier Court concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker
for determining when a school may punish student expression need
not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to
lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student
expression.”91
Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier might be read as creating another
exception to Tinker,92 as a modification of Tinker,93 or perhaps as
86.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271.

87.

Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).

88.

Id. at 271–72.

89.

Id. at 271.

90.

Id. at 272 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).

91.

Id. at 272–73.

92.

See Banasiak, supra note 59, at 1060 (“The first exception, delineated in Bethel
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, permits school officials to suppress speech
that is ‘offensively lewd and indecent;’ the second, delineated in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier, permits the restriction of speech that bears the
imprimatur of the school, so long as the regulation is related ‘to legitimate
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both.94 Further, whether reading these cases as creating exceptions or,
instead, as modifying the jurisprudence, one must decide whether to
read these decisions broadly or narrowly.95 The language in Fraser
permitting schools to prohibit student speech not in accord with the
school’s basic mission96 seems rather broad. The language in
Kuhlmeier permitting limitations on speech inconsistent with the
school’s or society’s positions on a variety of issues97 is also rather
forgiving. While Kuhlmeier might merely be read to afford discretion
to a school to avoid the attribution of views that the school does not
hold,98 the opinion need not be read in such a limited way. If the only
pedagogical concerns.’”); Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and
Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1167, 1191 (2009) (“[T]he
Supreme Court cannot continue to carve out exceptions to Tinker, as it has
done now in Fraser, Kuhlmeier and Morse.”); Jeremy Jorgensen, Student Rights
Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court’s Clouded Judgment in Morse v. Frederick,
25 Touro L. Rev. 739, 748 (2009) (“The second exception to Tinker emerged
in Kuhlmeier, decided less than two years after Fraser, in 1988.”); Allison E.
Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the
Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 Akron
L. Rev. 247, 253 (2010) (“Less than two years later, the Court added another
exception to the Tinker standard when it decided Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier.”).
93.

See Mickey Lee Jett, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker
in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 895, 903 (2012)
(“Less than two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier—the second case that scaled back Tinker’s broad
First Amendment protection.”).

94.

See Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One Year Later: New
Limitations on Student Speech and the “Columbine Factor”, 42 Suffolk U.
L. Rev. 427, 431 (2009) (“Two years after Fraser, the Court in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier created a third approach to student speech, and
a second exception to Tinker.”).

95.

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 58, at 662 (“Fraser and Kuhlmeier created narrow
exceptions.”). But see Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Uncertainty at the “Outer
Boundaries” of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 St. John’s J. Legal
Comment. 731, 738 (2010) (“The Court created vague exceptions to Tinker’s
general rule in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier.”); Shannon L. Noder, Morse v. Frederick: Students’
First Amendment Rights Restricted Again, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 859, 859
(2009) (“[In] Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court created exceptions to the standard
established in Tinker, thereby allowing for greater censorship of student
speech and unsettling this area of First Amendment jurisprudence.”).

96.

Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).

97.

Id. at 272 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).

98.

Id. at 271.
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evil to be avoided was a mistaken attribution of particular views to
the school, then the newspaper might simply have contained a
disclaimer that the views reflected therein were not necessarily
endorsed by the school.99
The Court’s next decision in this line of cases did not clarify these
issues very much either. Morse v. Frederick100 involved the
punishment of a student carrying a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS”101 at a school-sponsored event.102 While admitting that the
“message on Frederick’s banner is cryptic,”103 the Court nonetheless
suggested that the message might reasonably be understood to be
promoting illegal drug use.104 As such, the message’s suppression at a
school event did not violate First Amendment guarantees.105
The Morse Court did not help clarify Fraser and Kuhlmeier. With
respect to Fraser, the Court expressly noted that the “mode of
analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,”106 and then
commented that “it is enough to distill from Fraser two basic
principles:”107 (1) “Fraser’s holding demonstrates that ‘the
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’”108 and (2)
“Fraser established that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is
not absolute . . . [because] Fraser . . . did not conduct the ‘substantial
disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.”109 Basically, the Court
99.

Cf. Hon. Delissa A. Ridgway, Getting Published, 47 Fed. Law. 14, 16 (2000)
(“[A] piece by a U.S. government employee often includes a note that ‘the
views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.’”).

100. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
101. Id. at 397.
102. Id. at 401 (“[W]e agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot ‘stand
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned
activity and claim he is not at school.’”).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 403 (“The question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent
with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that
she may.”).
106. Id. at 404.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 404–05 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682
(1986)).
109. Id. at 405 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969)).
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suggested that Fraser establishes that the First Amendment freedoms
of students in school are not as robust as the rights of adults in other
settings and that a showing of a substantial disruption is not required
in order for a school speech prohibition to be compatible with
constitutional guarantees.
The Court’s discussion of Kuhlmeier did not limit its reach. While
the Morse Court noted that “Kuhlmeier does not control this case
because no one would reasonably believe that Frederick’s banner bore
the school’s imprimatur,”110 that comment merely explained why
Kuhlmeier was not dispositive. The Court’s comment did not
additionally suggest that Kuhlmeier was only relevant in cases
involving a mistaken imputation of imprimatur. Instead, the Court
read Kuhlmeier to support Fraser’s principles: (1) Kuhlmeier
“acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school,’”111
and (2) “like Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the
only basis for restricting student speech.”112
After supporting its contention that Kuhlmeier and Fraser established that student speech could be prohibited even if the Tinker
substantial-disruption standard had not been met, the Morse Court
started discussing the dangers of drug use: “Drug abuse can cause
severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young
people.”113 Because the speech at issue occurred during a school
event114 and because of “the governmental interest in stopping student
drug abuse,” schools are permitted “to restrict student expression that
they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”115
Yet, the government has an interest in preventing a variety of
student practices, so it is not clear what on-site speech the FraserKuhlmeier-Morse analysis permits schools to regulate. For example,
the state has an interest in preventing teenage pregnancy,116 and it is
unclear whether student discussions of such issues could be prohibited
even where there is no danger of a misattribution of the student’s
110. Id.
111. Id. at 405–06 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266
(1988)).
112. Id. at 406.
113. Id. at 407.
114. Id. at 408 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
115. Id.
116. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 472–73
(1981) (holding that a statute addressing “the problem of sexual intercourse
and teenage pregnancy” is “sufficiently related to the State’s objectives to
pass constitutional muster”).
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stated views to the school.117 Merely because Kuhlmeier would not be
dispositive118 in a case in which there was no danger of misattribution
of the views to the school would not prevent Kuhlmeier from
providing support for a particular prohibition.
The Morse Court limited Fraser by expressly rejecting that the
“case should . . . be read to encompass any speech that could fit
under some definition of ‘offensive,’”119 if only because “much political
and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”120 But
saying that some “offensive” speech is protected is not very helpful
without further specification of which speech is protected.
Justice Thomas would simply hold that the First Amendment
does not afford protection to student school speech.121 Justices Alito
and Kennedy joined the Morse opinion “on the understanding
that . . . it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social
issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.’”122 But such a
qualification “practically refutes itself.”123 If indeed “a nonsense
message”124 can reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal drug
use, then such a message might—instead or in addition—be viewed as
commenting on a social issue, in which case the prohibition’s
constitutionality should not have been upheld.
The Morse Court did not address whether “BONG HiTS 4
JESUS” could reasonably be viewed that way, instead addressing
whether it in fact was such a commentary.125 Because “not even
Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or
religious message,”126 the Court implied that the message could not be
117. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s
reasoning, must the First Amendment give way whenever a school seeks to
punish a student for any speech mentioning beer, or indeed anything else that
might be deemed risky to teenagers?”).
118. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
119. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment, as originally
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”).
122. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
123. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the
banner).
126. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403.

113

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017
Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the Constitution

read that way. Frederick was arguing that the message had no
meaning,127 so it was unsurprising that he was not claiming that it
had political or social content. If the message could be read as
advocating illegal drug use—his denial of that meaning
notwithstanding—then it could also be read as commenting on a
social issue. Indeed, the Court as much as said that itself when
offering the possible interpretation “bong hits [are a good thing],”128
which is clearly commenting on a social issue.
B. Student Speech Rights in Universities

The student-speech jurisprudence is subject to a variety of
interpretations. Some read Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as offering
narrow exceptions to Tinker.129 However, others read the
jurisprudence as vague and undefined130 or, perhaps, as remaining
open pending further developments.131 Not only is the best
interpretation of the student-speech jurisprudence open to debate, but
127. Id. at 402 (“The best Frederick can come up with is that the banner is
‘meaningless and funny.’”).
128. Id. (alteration in original).
129. See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A
Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 404 (2011) (“Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse are seen as mere exceptions to Tinker’s general rule.”);
see also Brandon James Hoover, The First Amendment Implications of
Facebook, Myspace, and Other Online Activity of Students in Public High
Schools, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 309, 326 (2009) (“In Fraser, the Court
carved out the exception for lewd, sexual, and profane speech. Next, in
Kuhlmeier, the Court carved out the exception for school-sponsored speech, or
what may also be referred to as speech that includes the school’s imprimatur
on it. And, recently, the Court, in Morse, carved out a special exception
stating a school may categorically prohibit speech dealing with pro-drug
messages.”); Darin M. Williams, Tinker Operationalized: The Judiciary’s
Practical Answer to Student Cyberspeech, 62 DePaul L. Rev. 125, 134
(2012) (“[T]he most efficient and reasonable approach to student speech is to
first examine whether the speech in question falls into any of the exceptions
outlined by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse”).
130. See Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of
Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 572, 579 (2009) (“In Fraser,
Kuhlmeier, and Morse, the Court appears to have established exceptions to
the Tinker substantial disruption test without expressly overruling it, leaving
a muddled and erratic doctrine.”).
131. See Mark Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and
Parodies, 15 First Amend. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2016) (“The [Morse] Court
implied that both Fraser and Kuhlmeier left open how broadly the exception
to Tinker should be read rather than representing limited exceptions involving
perceived state endorsement or the use of sexually indecent language.”);
Jorgensen, supra note 92, at 744 (“[W]hile Morse may appear as a narrow
exception to the holding of Tinker, it has broad implications.”).
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an additional difficulty is that the circuits are split with respect to
whether this is the correct jurisprudence to apply when seeking to
assess the constitutionality of dismissals of students from professional
programs in college or graduate school.132
It is not as if the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of a student’s dismissal from a university program. In two
different cases, the Court addressed whether student dismissals from
professional programs violated due process guarantees.
In Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz,133 the
Court addressed the constitutionality of the University of Missouri–
Kansas City Medical School’s dismissal of a student during her final
year of study.134 Charlotte Horowitz claimed that her procedural due
process rights had been violated by her dismissal.135
During her first year of study several faculty had noted that her
“‘performance was below that of her peers in all clinical patientoriented settings,’ that she was erratic in her attendance at clinical
sessions, and that she lacked a critical concern for personal
hygiene.”136 Many members of the faculty continued to be dissatisfied
the following year.137 It was not as if the faculty failed to apprise her
of their concerns—on the contrary, she was informed that the faculty
believed that her skills were deficient and that the failure to improve
would affect when or even whether she could graduate.138 Because she
had been on notice and because there is a “significant difference
between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and the
violation by a student of valid rules of conduct,”139 the Court held
that due process guarantees had been met.140
The Court explained that academic and disciplinary judgments
differed in important ways: “[a]cademic evaluations of a student, in
contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the
judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have
132. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split).
133. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
134. Id. at 79.
135. Id. at 79–80.
136. Id. at 81.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 85 (“The school fully informed respondent of the faculty’s
dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the danger that this posed to
timely graduation and continued enrollment.”).
139. Id. at 86.
140. Id. at 84–85 (“Assuming the existence of a liberty or property interest,
respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth
Amendment requires.”).
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traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement.”141 Yet, by distinguishing in this way, the Court not only left open what would satisfy
due process requirements in the University context where disciplinary
action was at issue,142 but also how to distinguish between disciplinary
and academic punishment.143
The Horowitz Court characterized the “educational process [as]
not by nature adversar[ial]; instead it centers around a continuing
relationship between faculty and students.”144 Teachers are likely to
need to take on a variety of roles as the student “advances through
the varying regimes of the educational system, and the instruction
becomes both more individualized and more specialized.”145 In
addition, some deference is owed because “[c]ourts are particularly illequipped to evaluate academic performance.”146 For all of these
reasons, the Court refused to “formalize the academic dismissal
process by requiring a hearing.”147
In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,148 the Court examined whether the University of Michigan’s refusal to permit a student
to retake an examination deprived that student of due process.149
Scott Ewing was accepted into a special program at the University of
Michigan whereby an individual could receive an undergraduate
degree and a medical degree in six years.150 However, the program

141. Id. at 89.
142. See Mary Ann Connell & Donna Gurley, The Right of Educational
Institutions to Withhold or Revoke Academic Degrees, 32 J.C. & U.L. 51, 70
n.138 (2005) (suggesting that a sliding scale is used such that more due
process is required where the punishments are more severe).
143. Cf. Jack E. Byrom, To Love and Die in Dixon: An Argument for Stricter
Judicial Review in Cases of Academic Misconduct, 31 Rev. Litig. 147, 170
(2012) (“In order to protect the constitutional rights of these students, it is
essential for the courts to clarify what issues qualify for protection as
‘academic’ matters and what must be subject to due process analysis as
‘disciplinary’ matters.”).
144. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 92.
147. Id. at 90.
148. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
149. Id. at 215 (“The question presented is whether the University’s action
deprived Ewing of property without due process of law because its refusal to
allow him to retake the examination was an arbitrary departure from the
University’s past practice.”).
150. Id. (“In the fall of 1975 Ewing enrolled in a special 6-year program of study,
known as ‘Inteflex,’ offered jointly by the undergraduate college and the
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required the student to receive a passing score of a national exam
prior to beginning the last two years.151
After completing the requirements of the first four years,152 Ewing
took and failed the national exam, receiving a 235 score where a 345
score was required for passing.153 After considering Ewing’s record in
some detail, the Promotion and Review Board dismissed Ewing from
the program.154 Ewing wrote a letter requesting reconsideration, and
the Board reconvened to reconsider its decision.155 Ewing personally
addressed the committee, explaining why his score on the national
test did not reflect his abilities.156 The Board again voted, reaffirming
the decision to drop Ewing from the program.157
Ewing appealed to the Executive Committee of the Medical
school.158 After permitting him to speak in person, the Committee
voted to deny his request for a leave of absence to give him an
opportunity to retake the national exam.159 He appeared before that
committee two more times, unsuccessfully seeking readmission to the
Medical School.160 He then filed suit against the school, claiming that
substantive due process guarantees had been violated.161
The Supreme Court assumed for purposes of the case that Ewing
did have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuation
in the program.162 However, that right only entitled Ewing “to con-

Medical School. An undergraduate degree and a medical degree are awarded
upon successful completion of the program.”).
151. Id. at 215–16 (“The student must also pass the ‘NBME Part I’—a 2-day
written test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners.”).
152. Id. at 216 (“Ewing successfully completed the courses prescribed for the first
four years of the Inteflex program and thereby qualified to take the NBME
Part I.”).
153. Id. (“Ewing failed five of the seven subjects on that examination . . . .”).
154. Id. at 216.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 216–17.
161. Id. at 217 (“As a matter of federal law, Ewing alleged that he had a property
interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that his
dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, violating his ‘substantive due process
rights’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
162. Id. at 223.
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tinued enrollment free from arbitrary state action,” and the Court
accepted that the record contained no evidence of arbitrariness.163
While other students had been allowed to retake the national
exam in the past and Ewing was the first to have been denied that
opportunity,164 that alone did not establish that the faculty was acting
arbitrarily. The Court reasoned that “the faculty’s decision was made
conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation
of the entirety of Ewing’s academic career.”165 Further, the Court cautioned that courts should not override such a decision “unless it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually
exercise professional judgment.”166
The Ewing Court noted that it might have been wiser to have
permitted Ewing to take the test again, if only to avoid the costs
associated with litigating this issue.167 Even so, the Court found that
“his dismissal from the Inteflex program rested on an academic judgment that is not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decisionmaking when viewed against the background of his entire career at
the University of Michigan, including his singularly low score on the
NBME Part I examination.”168 Thus, even assuming that there is
some substantive due process right to continuation in a university
program, Ewing illustrates that such a right is rather weak because it
only guards against arbitrary state action.

II. Lower Courts on Dismissal from University
Professional Programs
The lower courts have addressed several cases in which the constitutionality of a university dismissal from a professional program was
at issue. However, the courts cannot agree about whether the Court’s
high school student speech jurisprudence is applicable in the
university context169 or about how to apply the Court’s guidance when
163. Id. (“[T]he facts of record disclose no such action.”).
164. Id. at 219.
165. Id. at 225.
166. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
167. Id. at 227.
168. Id. at 227–28.
169. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We hold, therefore,
that Hazelwood’s framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at
colleges as well as elementary and secondary schools.”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d
939, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In view of a university’s strong interest in
setting the content of its curriculum and teaching that content, Hazelwood
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it does seem applicable. Rather than coalescing, the lower courts seem
to be diverging about which standards to use or how they should be
applied.
A. Internet Postings

Two cases out of Minnesota illustrate some of the difficulties that
can arise when individuals post comments on the internet. One factor
complicating these analyses was that some of the comments at issue
provides a workable standard for evaluating a university student’s First
Amendment claim stemming from curricular speech.”); Axson-Flynn v.
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that the
Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that
occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”); Vanderhurst v.
Colorado Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 2000), as
amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (“This court will thus assume
for purposes of this appeal that the analytical framework established in
Kuhlmeier is indeed appropriate to this case; we need not decide definitively,
however, whether that framework does in fact govern a public college or
university’s control over the classroom speech of a professor or other
instructor.”). But see Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I disagree with Judge
Graber because she would have this court adopt an erroneous First
Amendment standard [Kuhlmeier] for a university’s attempts to regulate the
speech of college and graduate students.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d
850, 862 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016) (“Nor has Judge
Graber’s reasoning been adopted by our precedents since.”); id. (“When the
University recommends a student for certification, it communicates to the
world that, in its view, that student is fit to practice the profession; as a
result, the University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it approves to
teach.”); id. at 863 (“This case presents no occasion to extend student speech
doctrine to the university setting.”); Pugel v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 378
F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 2004) (“As a teaching assistant employed by the
University, Ms. Pugel was a public employee as well as a graduate student.”);
id. at 667–68 (“We therefore evaluate Ms. Pugel’s speech under the wellestablished Connick–Pickering framework of analysis.”); Flint v. Dennison,
488 F.3d 816, 836 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By creating a student election process, the
University of Montana has opened a limited public forum dedicated to allow
campaigning for and election to leadership positions in student government.
The University’s purpose in opening such a forum is to provide student
candidates and student voters a certain type of educational experience. We
hold that imposing an expenditure limitation on student candidates is
viewpoint neutral and serves to effectuate the purpose of the ASUM elections.
We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
defendants.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001)
(discussing why Kuhlmeier was not appropriate to apply in university
context); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473,
480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier . . . is not
applicable to college newspapers.”). Cf. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (“We
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university
level.”).
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were viewed as threatening, which might have made the speech
unprotected under the First Amendment in any event.170 The
Minnesota Supreme Court decided one of the cases while the Eighth
Circuit decided the other, although both decisions were somewhat
confusing in their rationales.
Tatro v. University of Minnesota171 involved a student who was a
junior in the Mortuary Science Program at the University of Minnesota.172 The Mortuary Science Program is a special program for
upper-class students preparing them to be morticians or funeral
directors.173 The laboratory component makes use of voluntarily
donated cadavers.174
Amanda Tatro was enrolled in three required laboratory classes.175
Prior to participating in any of those classes, she had entered into an
agreement with the university that she would be respectful towards
the cadavers.176 While the rules permitted “respectful and discreet”
discussion “of cadaver dissection outside the laboratory,”177 they
expressly “prohibited ‘blogging’ about the anatomy lab or cadaver
dissection.”178 The anatomy lab instructor had explained that
“‘blogging’ was intended to be a broad term,”179 and that the students
had been told during their “orientation that blogging included
Facebook and Twitter.”180
Tatro posted statements on Facebook, which she has described in
court filings as “satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her
school experience.”181 Her posts included the following:

170. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First
Amendment . . . permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’” (citing Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))).
171. 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012).
172. Id. at 511.
173. Id. at 511–12.
174. Id. at 512.
175. Id.
176. Id. (“Tatro . . . signed the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy
Access Orientation Disclosure Form, acknowledging that she understood and
agreed to comply with the program rules, as well as ‘additional laboratory
policies’ stated in the course syllabus.”).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 511.
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Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie
today. Let’s see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding and
having my scalpel taken away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my
sleeve . . . [November 12, 2009]
Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to Monday’s
embalming therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to
aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to be taken out with
a trocar. [December 6, 2009]
Amanda Beth Tatro Who knew embalming lab was so
cathartic! I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat
with a trocar though. Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the
evening updating my “Death List # 5” and making friends with
the crematory guy. I do know the code . . . [December 7, 2009]
Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness that my
best friend, Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next
week. I wish to accompany him to the retort. Now where will I
go or who will I hang with when I need to gather my sanity?
Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket. [Undated.]182

Her postings about stabbing someone with a trocar183 and hiding a
scalpel in her sleeve made several individuals nervous.184 She was told
to stay away from the department and staff while her comments were
investigated.185 Tatro—who believed that she had been suspended—
reported the school’s actions and her posts to the media.186 She
appeared on local TV channels, which resulted in the Anatomy
Program receiving “letters and calls from donor families and the
general public who expressed concerns about Tatro’s lack of
professionalism, poor judgment, and immaturity.”187
The Office of Student Conduct and Academic Integrity
(“OSCAI”) began an investigation of Tatro’s conduct to see whether

182. Id. at 512–13.
183. Id. at 513 n.2 (“A trocar is a long hollow needle made of stainless steel that is
typically inserted into the body during embalming to aspirate gas and
fluids.”).
184. Id. at 513 (“The Director testified that ‘[t]here was a lot of fear’ surrounding
Tatro’s post about stabbing someone with a trocar and hiding a scalpel in her
sleeve.”).
185. Id. University police ultimately determined that no crime had been
committed.” Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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she had violated the University’s Student Conduct Code.188 Tatro
appealed to the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (“CCSB”),
challenging the OSCAI investigation.189 At the CCSB hearing, the
director and two program instructors testified “about the program’s
emphasis on respect, dignity, and professionalism as a foundation for
later working as a funeral director or mortician, as well as the need
for respect for the donors to the Anatomy Bequest Program.”190 The
CCSB found Tatro “responsible for violating the Student Conduct
Code provision prohibiting threatening conduct,”191 and also for
having violated the anti-blogging rule.192 The CSSB recommended
imposing the following sanctions:
1. Changing Tatro’s grade in MORT 3171 to an “F.”
2. Completion of a “directed study course” in clinical ethics.
3. A letter to one of the faculty members in the Mortuary
Science Program addressing the issue of respect within the
program and the profession.
4. A psychiatric evaluation at the student health service clinic
and completion of any recommendations made by their
evaluation.
5. Placement on probation for the remainder of Tatro’s
undergraduate career.193

Those recommendations were adopted by the Provost,194 and
Tatro challenged the imposition of those sanctions as a violation of
her First Amendment rights.195 The Minnesota Supreme Court
rejected the application of both Kuhlmeier196 and Tinker.197 After
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 514.
191. Id.
192. Id. (“The CCSB also found Tatro responsible for violating several University
rules, . . . includ[ing] . . . Anatomy Laboratory Rule # 7, which provides in
part that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not
allowable’ . . . .”).
193. Id. at 514–15.
194. Id. at 515.
195. Id. at 515–16.
196. See id. at 518 (concluding that University’s argument based on the Kuhlmeier
case is not applicable to the case at bar).
197. Id. at 519.
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noting the parties’ agreement that “a university may regulate student
speech on Facebook that violates established professional conduct
standards,”198 the court further elaborated on the relevant test by
suggesting that “any restrictions on a student’s Facebook posts must
be narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional
conduct standards.”199 When doing this analysis, the court focused on
whether the “University’s restrictions on the mode, manner, and place
of student speech are ‘substantially broader than necessary’ to achieve
the objective of ensuring that students treat human cadavers with
respect and dignity.”200
Tatro complained that the University was enforcing “‘accepted
unwritten social norms’—not any ‘specific standards or authorities
governing professional behavior.’”201 For example, because her posts
“did not reveal any personally identifiable facts, data, or information
about the human cadaver she was studying,”202 she contended that the
University’s claim that it was merely enforcing professional norms
should be rejected and that the University was “violat[ing] her free
speech rights by sanctioning her for using her ‘Facebook page as a
literary device to express her emotions.’”203 But the high court
disagreed, instead finding that “the academic program rules of the
Mortuary Science Program, as applied, are narrowly tailored.”204 The
court rejected that her discussion of the cadaver had been respectful.
Giving the human cadaver a name derived from a comedy film
about a corpse and posting commentary about “playing” with
the human cadaver, taking her “aggression” out on the human
cadaver, and keeping a “[l]ock of hair” in her pocket are
incompatible with the notions of respect and dignity for the
individual who chose to donate his body to support the research
and education missions of the Anatomy Bequest Program.205

198. Id. at 521.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 523 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
201. Id. at 521.
202. Id. at 522.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 523.
205. Id.
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Tatro denied that her speech constituted a true threat,206 notwithstanding her admission that others unfamiliar with her sense of humor
might misunderstand the nature of her comments.207 The University
argued that it could “constitutionally impose discipline for threatening
speech that substantially disrupted the Mortuary Science Program.”208
The court decided not to treat “the threatening speech as a standalone violation, particularly since the complaint and sanctions here
appear to have been based on the totality of the posts.”209 Perhaps
that was because the court did not believe that her comments
constituted a true threat,210 although the court might instead have
believed that there were so many justifiable bases for the sanctions
that there was no need to examine each.
The court’s justifications for upholding the sanctions sent a
variety of mixed signals. For example, the court noted that respectful
treatment of cadavers “is imperative to maintaining the trust of the
individuals who donate their bodies to the Anatomy Bequest
Program.”211 There would be serious consequences if individuals lost
faith in the University’s assurances of proper treatment—“there would
not be a Mortuary Science Program if people were not willing to
donate their bodies after death to the Anatomy Bequest Program.”212
Yet, programs might be ended for a variety of reasons, such as a lack
of adequate resources. The court noted that the university had not
claimed that Tatro’s comments would result in fewer donations,213 but
did not explain whether such a claim, if substantiated, would have
206. Id. at 524 (“Tatro argues that the University cannot discipline her for any
speech that does not constitute a ‘true threat’ and claims that her Facebook
posts do not constitute a ‘true threat.’”).
207. Id. at 514 (“She also knew that ‘all the Mort Sci kids’ would see the post, but
she never intended to incite or induce fear in anyone. Tatro conceded,
however, that she could understand how others might misunderstand her
sense of humor, especially when taken out of context.”).
208. Id. at 524.
209. Id.
210. See Meggen Lindsay, Note, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School FreeSpeech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v.
University of Minnesota, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1470, 1509 (2012)
(“Arguably, the court did not undertake a true-threat analysis because
Tatro’s speech clearly did not constitute a true threat.”). But see Tracey
Wirmani, Note, Tinker Takes on Tatro: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
Missed Opportunity, 65 Okla. L. Rev. 769, 793 (2013) (“[T]he true threat
standard would have met the university’s needs.”).
211. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523.
212. Id. at 523–24.
213. Id. at 523.
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justified the university’s actions. If so, then an individual student’s
program completion might be dependent upon her not upsetting a
generous donor.
The reason that the University received a variety of complaints
about Tatro’s actions was that she had appeared on local TV
stations,214 which had occurred after Tatro had wrongly concluded
that she had been suspended.215 But this was only indirectly related to
the wrongful behavior for which she was being punished. Had the
investigation of her Facebook postings remained internal to the
University, it seems doubtful that the University would have received
many calls about Tatro’s lack of professionalism. But one cannot tell
from the court’s opinion whether her punishment would have been
upheld if the program had not received any complaints from the
public.
Suppose that Tatro had appeared on local TV for some other
reason such as explaining to the public what it was like to live with a
particular disease.216 If she had identified herself as participating in
the Mortuary Program and had she struck the audience as being
unprofessional, the audience members might still have complained to
the University and, perhaps, been less willing to support the Program.
Presumably, her undermining the program in that way would not
have made her subject to punishment.
The Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to focus on ways that
Tatro had disrupted the program, which was what the University had
alleged.217 But the standard employed by the Minnesota Supreme
Court was whether Tatro had violated “established professional
conduct standards,”218 and the focus of those standards is not on the
success of a particular university program but, instead, on assuring
that professionals are respectful when handling the remains of loved
ones.219
214. Id. at 513 (“After Tatro appeared on local television stations, the Anatomy
Bequest Program received letters and calls from donor families and the
general public who expressed concerns about Tatro’s lack of professionalism,
poor judgment, and immaturity.”).
215. Id. at 513.
216. Id. at 514 (“Tatro suffers from a debilitating central nervous system
disease . . . .”).
217. Id. at 523; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text (emphasizng that
the “[u]niversity’s rules and policies governing access to human cadavers are
unique because respectful treatment of human cadavers is imperative to
maintaining the trust of the individuals who donate their bodies to the
Anatomy Bequest Program.”).
218. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521.
219. See Ashley C. Johnson, Note, “Narrowly Tailored” and “Directly Related”:
How the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling in Tatro v. University of
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By focusing on the possibility that Tatro’s comments would
reduce the number of donated cadavers, the court offered no guidance
about how or whether to consider the views of those who expressed
fear that Tatro might have a scalpel hidden in her sleeve or that
Tatro might stab someone with a trocar. The expression of such views
might be disruptive in a number of ways, because both instructors
and students might be wary of working with or being near someone
whom they view as dangerous.220 One could not tell whether the
Minnesota Supreme Court believed those worries unfounded or,
instead, a separate basis upon which the sanctions might have been
justified.221
The Eighth Circuit was afforded an opportunity to clarify whether
a university student having made (allegedly) threatening statements
justifies his dismissal from a professional program. Keefe v. Adams222
involved a student, Craig Keefe, who had been removed from a
Nursing Program for “behavior unbecoming of the profession and
transgression of personal boundaries.”223
A student had complained about some of Keefe’s Facebook posts,
which she found “threatening and related to the classroom.”224 The
complaining student said that she would be unable to function with
him at the clinical site.225
The Director of Nursing, Connie Frisch, set up a meeting with
Keefe to express her concerns about some of his posts. Those posts
included:
Glad group projects are group projects. I give her a big fat F for
changing the group power point at eleven last night and
resubmitting. Not enough whiskey to control that anger.

Minnesota Leaves Post-Secondary Students Powerless to the Often Broad and
Indirect Rules of Their Public Universities, 36 Hamline L. Rev. 311, 325
(2013) (“[The rules T]atro was found to have violated were directly related to
established professional standards that require professionals within the
mortuary field to treat all individuals encountered within the scope of the
profession with dignity and respect.”).
220. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 513.
221. See Wirmani, supra note 210, at 783 (“[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court failed
to provide guidance to universities concerned about maintaining both student
safety and First Amendment freedoms.”).
222. 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016).
223. Id. at 525.
224. Id. at 526.
225. Id. at 532.
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Doesn’t anyone know or have heard of mechanical pencils. Im
going to take this electric pencil sharpener in this class and give
someone a hemopneumothorax with it before to long. I might
need some anger management.
LMAO [a classmate], you keep reporting my post and get me
banded. I don’t really care. If thats the smartest thing you can
come up with than I completely understand why your going to
fail out of the RN program you stupid bitch. . . . And quite
creeping on my page. Your not a friend of mine for a reason. If
you don’t like what I have to say than don’t come and ask me,
thats basically what creeping is isn’t it. Stay off my page . . . .226

Frisch
thought
the
post
about
giving
someone
a
hemopneumothorax the most disconcerting.227 However, she was also
concerned about Keefe’s self-described anger-management issues, especially when he became argumentative during his meeting with
her.228
Keefe explained that he jokes on his Facebook page, although he
also suggested that his page might have been hacked.229 However, he
later confirmed in a deposition that he had written the posts in question.230 Because of his lack of remorse and because he did not express
a desire to change, Frisch decided to remove him from the program.231
The Nursing Program Student Handbook stated that “all current
and future students are expected to adhere to the policies and
procedures of this student handbook.”232 Included within that
handbook was the provision that “students who fail to meet the
moral, ethical, or professional behavioral standards of the nursing
program are not eligible to progress in the nursing program.”233
Behaviors that offended this policy included “transgression of
professional boundaries” and “behavior unbecoming of the Nursing
Profession.”234
226. Id. at 526–27.
227. Id. at 527 n.3 (“Keefe testified that a hemopneumothorax is a ‘trauma’ where
the lung is punctured and air and blood flood the lung cavity; it is not a
medical procedure.”).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 528.
234. Id.
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A separate section of the handbook described the ways that individuals should treat their colleagues. “The nurse maintains compassionate and caring relationships with colleagues and others with a
commitment to the fair treatment of individuals, to integritypreserving compromise, and to resolving conflict.”235 The handbook
noted in particular that the “standard of conduct precludes any and
all forms of prejudicial actions, any form of harassment or threatening
behavior, or disregard for the effect of one’s actions on others.”236
Nurses are expressly told that they must “recognize[] and maintain[]
boundaries that establish appropriate limits to relationships,” and
that “[i]n all encounters, nurses are responsible for retaining their
professional boundaries.”237
When addressing “whether the First Amendment precludes a
public university from adopting, as part of its curriculum for
obtaining a graduate degree in a health care profession, the Code of
Ethics adopted by a nationally recognized association of practicing
professionals,”238 the Eighth Circuit began by rejecting the contention
that Keefe’s postings were unprotected speech.239 This was a
surprising way to begin, because comments about giving someone
within the class a hemopneumothorax coupled with comments about
one’s own anger-management issues might well be taken to constitute
a true threat, which has already been recognized as a category of
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.240 Indeed, the Eighth
Circuit characterized one of the postings as “includ[ing] a physical
threat related to their medical studies,”241 and unsurprisingly
concluded that the “First Amendment did not bar educator Frisch
from making the determination that Keefe was unable to meet the
professional demands of being a nurse.”242
Keefe had claimed that because his speech was protected by the
First Amendment, the College was barred from punishing his off-cam-

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 528–29.
238. Id. at 529–30.
239. See id. at 530 (stating that the First Amendment fully applies to Facebook
postings).
240. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (stating that “[f]or example,
the First Amendment permits a State to ban ‘true threats’ . . . .”).
241. Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532.
242. Id. at 533.
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pus speech.243 The Eighth Circuit rejected Keefe’s “categorical” approach,244 instead suggesting that “[a] student may demonstrate an
unacceptable lack of professionalism off campus, as well as in the
classroom, and by speech as well as conduct.”245 The court noted that
two students had complained about Keefe’s comments to a
professor.246 One said that she could not work “in the same clinical
space with Keefe.”247 The court explained that “Keefe’s disrespectful
and threatening statements toward his colleagues had a direct impact
on the students’ educational experience [and] . . . also had the
potential to impact patient care,”248 if only because those comments
might make communication and collaboration difficult if not
impossible.249 The mysterious part of the Eighth Circuit decision was
not in its finding that Keefe’s expression was unprofessional, but in its
suggesting that the threats were protected by the First Amendment.250
The Eighth Circuit’s approach has at least two drawbacks. First,
it makes unclear what would constitute threatening speech and,
second, it seems to use a rather broad and ill-defined professionalism
standard. Without more, one could not know what kind of off-campus
speech would qualify as unprofessional and thus put an individual at
risk of being dropped from a program if having made unpopular but
non-threatening comments.
B. Untoward Behavior

Part of being a professional involves acting in appropriate ways
and at least one issue involves which inappropriate actions will justify
243. Id. at 531 (“On appeal, Keefe framed this contention categorically, arguing
that a college student may not be punished for off-campus speech unless it is
speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity.”).
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 545–46 (6th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 790 (2013); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816
N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012)).
246. Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. (“As [Professor] Scott testified, ‘when [students] are in the clinical
setting taking care of patients, if we are creating [a] situation where they are
not obviously communicating and collaborating, that can result in poor
outcomes for the patients.’”).
250. See Elissa Kerr, Note, Professional Standards on Social Media: How Colleges
and Universities Have Denied Students’ Constitutional Rights and Courts
Refused to Intervene, 41 J.C. & U.L. 601, 621 (2015) (“Central Lakes
College could also have disciplined Keefe for the violent nature of his posts or
the threats contained in them.”).
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an individual’s dismissal from a professional program. Al-Dabagh v.
Case Western Reserve University251 illustrates the wide range of
behaviors that might be considered relevant when assessing an
individual’s lack of professionalism.
Case Western Medical School includes several “core competencies”252 within its curriculum, including that a student manifest
professionalism in the following ways:
Consistently demonstrate[] ethical, honest, responsible and
reliable behavior.
Identif[y] challenges to professionalism and develop[] a strategy
to maintain professional behaviors when adherence to
professional standards is threatened in the clinical and/or
research settings.
Engage[] in respectful dialogue with peers, faculty, and patients,
to enhance learning and resolve differences.
Recognize[] personal limitations and biases and find[] ways to
overcome them.253

Amir Al-Dabagh was a good student.254 However, his professionalism was another matter. For example, in one of his first-year
classes, he was tardy almost thirty percent of the time, which
repeatedly delayed the class.255 He was accused of behaving
inappropriately with some female classmates,256 although he disputed
those charges, as well as a charge that he had taken a cab and then
attempted to leave without paying.257 His alleged conduct resulted in
his having to meet with a Committee on Students at the Medical
School, “which forced him to undergo ‘an intervention on
professionalism’ and threatened him with ‘dismissal’ if ‘further issues’
arose.”258

251. 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015).
252. Id. at 357.
253. Id.
254. Id. (“He did well academically.”).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 358 (“[T]wo female students accused Al–Dabagh of behaving
inappropriately at a formal dance . . . .”).
257. Id. (stating that Al-Dabagh claimed “[h]e never harassed anyone, never tried
to welch on the driver”).
258. Id.
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He allegedly did not deal well with other medical personnel or
patients on occasion.259 However, he believed that some of this
criticism was due to his critical attitude toward one of his
supervisors—a view corroborated by an independent evaluator.260
Nonetheless, the Committee took strong action in light of these
breaches, “requiring him to repeat [an] internship and enrolling him in
‘gender specific training.’”261 In addition, the Committee decided to
add a negative addendum to his recommendation for residency
programs, which itself was both unusual and harmful to his career.262
Despite all of these infractions, Al-Dabagh was invited to graduate.263 But he acted inappropriately again. He was convicted of
driving while intoxicated in North Carolina.264 He claimed that he had
not been drunk, but had hit a utility pole when swerving to avoid
hitting a deer.265
The University refused to certify him for graduation and further
dismissed him from the program.266 Al-Dabagh challenged his
dismissal, arguing that it was based on infractions that either never
occurred or had alternative explanations.267 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that deference was owed to the University both with respect
to whether it credited his explanations of the events268 and with
respect to whether it believed expulsion from the program the
appropriate response in light of his lack of professionalism.269

259. Id. (“Nurses and hospital staffers ‘consistently complained about his
demeanor;’ a patient’s family once ‘kicked him out of the room;’ and he
sometimes gave patient-status presentations without first preparing.”).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (“[A] faculty supporter described [the addendum]
permanent[ly] . . . damaging’ and ‘too heavy a punishment.’”).

as

‘very

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 361 (“Al–Dabagh, last of all, claims that the Committee faulted him for
things that didn’t happen (for instance, the sexual harassment incidents at
the Hippo Ball) and disregarded his explanations for the things that did (for
instance, his poor internship performance and his driving-while-intoxicated
conviction).”).
268. Id. (“It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Committee to credit other
accounts above Al–Dabagh’s.”).
269. Id. at 359 (“Al–Dabagh’s dismissal on professionalism grounds amounts to a
deference-receiving academic judgment.”).
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Al-Dabagh argued that the University’s position did not make
sense—it was willing to recommend him for a residency despite his
tardiness, the alleged incidents of inappropriate behavior with
classmates, and the alleged attempt to leave a cab without paying.270
It had even invited him to graduate before his car accident.271 It was
only after he had been convicted of driving under the influence that
he was expelled from the program.272 While drunk driving is itself a
serious concern,273 that concern might be met by a state revoking his
driver’s license274 rather than the university revoking his medical
degree.275 Certainly, it would be a different story if Al–Dabagh had
shown up drunk to treat patients.276 But there was no indication other
than the one accident that Al–Dabagh had difficulties with alcohol,277
and the Sixth Circuit itself admitted that the University’s position
was “unconvincing.”278 Nonetheless, when Al–Dabagh invited the
court to “decide for [itself] whether he behaved in a sufficiently
professional way to merit a degree,”279 the court demurred, explaining
270. Id. at 361.
271. Id. at 358.
272. Id.
273. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (citing National
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 2014 Alcohol–Impaired Driving 2) (“Alcohol
consumption is a leading cause of traffic fatalities and injuries. During the
past decade, annual fatalities in drunk-driving accidents ranged from 13,582
deaths in 2005 to 9,865 deaths in 2011.”).
274. See Major Frank W. Fountain, Aiding and Abetting Involuntary Manslaughter
and Negligent Homicide: An Unprincipled Extension of Principal Liability,
1991 Army Law. 3, 9 (1991) (“An increasing number of states also have
enacted automatic license revocation laws, providing that drivers who fail or
refuse to take an alcohol breath test automatically will lose their licenses.”).
275. See Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 359 (“[C]ase Western did not move for a stay.
Instead, it complied with the injunction and gave Al–Dabagh a degree.
Thanks to its decision, Al–Dabagh is now a practicing resident. Doesn’t that
moot the case? No, because the university will revoke that degree if it wins.”).
276. Cf. Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Reforming the National Practitioner Data Bank to
Promote Fair Med-Mal Outcomes, 5 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 1, 87–88
(2013) (discussing the creation of the NPDB board to prevent incompetent
doctors, such as a “doctor [who] reported to the emergency room while
drunk[,]” from jumping from state to state without repercussion).
277. But see Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 23 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870 (N.D.
Ohio 2014), rev’d, 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015) (“After the Ball, three
students complained that Al–Dabagh was drunk at the dance and harassed
several women with dance requests.”).
278. Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 361.
279. Id.
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that making such a judgment “goes beyond [its] job description.”280 No
evidence was presented “suggest[ing] that the university had
impermissible motives or acted in bad faith,”281 and the court was
confident that “nothing in [its] deferential standard prevents [it] from
invalidating genuinely objectionable actions when they occur.”282
While the court understood that “an expansive view of
professionalism might forgive, or provide a cloak for, arbitrary or
discriminatory behavior,”283 the court saw “no such problem here.”284
Al-Dabagh stands for the proposition that courts must give university
academic decisions considerable deference.285
C. Views or Practices?

In Oyama v. University of Hawaii,286 the Ninth Circuit issued a
decision that obscured—rather than clarified—its reasoning. At issue
was the refusal of the University of Hawaii to permit Mark Oyama to
become a student teacher.287 Oyama was a student in a secondaryeducation certificate program at the University of Hawaii at Manoa,288
a program that required the completion of coursework and one
semester of student teaching.289 Acceptance into the program did not
guarantee a student-teaching placement.290
In a written assignment, Oyama expressed his view that sexual
relations between children and adults should be legal if consensual.291
When one of his teachers noted that Oyama would have to report a
relationship between a twelve-year-old and an adult if such a relationship came to light, Oyama responded that he would follow the law
and report the relationship, even though he did not believe that such
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 357 (holding that the “lack-of-professionalism finding amounts to an
academic judgment to which courts owe considerable deference”).
286. 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015).
287. Id. at 854 (“The University of Hawaii denied secondary education candidate
Mark L. Oyama’s application to become a student teacher, a prerequisite for
recommendation to the State of Hawaii’s teacher certification board.”).
288. Id. at 855.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 856 (“I even think that real life child predation should be legal,
provided that the child is consentual [sic].”).
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relationships were wrong.292 The teacher worried that Oyama might
not be sufficiently sensitive to the needs of adolescents.293
In addition, Oyama believed that many children characterized as
having disabilities were “fakers”294—“he was ‘not convinced that many
“disabilities” are actual disabilities or medically-based neurological
conditions, but are rather the crude opinions of psychologists and
psychiatrists.’”295 But such a view seemed inconsistent with “both an
HTSB [Hawaii Teacher Standards Board] standard requiring teachers
to ‘[p]rovide services to students in a nondiscriminatory manner’ and
an NCATE [National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education]
standard requiring teachers to demonstrate professional dispositions
necessary to teach ‘all students,’ including those ‘with exceptionalities.’”296
Oyama participated in a field placement experience at a middle
school where he received multiple unacceptable ratings with respect to
his “ability to teach effectively, work collaboratively with colleagues,
respond to suggestions from supervisors, and demonstrate the level of
professionalism expected of middle school teachers.”297 Oyama’s supervising instructor concluded that “Mark would not do well as a middle
school teacher.”298
In analyzing whether Oyama’s constitutional rights had been
abridged when he was denied the opportunity to do student teaching,
the Ninth Circuit explained that “the University must comply with
the Hawaii Teacher Standards Board’s (“HTSB”) teacher licensing
and ethical standards. HTSB standards require teachers to, among
other things, protect student safety, create an inclusive learning
environment for all students, and demonstrate professionalism.”299 But
Oyama’s comments allegedly undercut his ability to meet those
standards. For example, “Oyama’s belief that young children can
meaningfully ‘consent’ to sexual activity with adults, and failure to
appreciate the lifelong impact on victims of child sexual abuse, could
well impede him from recognizing signs of such abuse in his students
292. Id.
293. Id. (“Dr. Moniz . . . explain[ed] that, while she did not ‘mind that [Oyama]
has opinions that are different from other people’s,’ she was concerned that
Oyama ‘may not be aware of and in agreement with safety issues about the
adolescents who will be in his care.’”).
294. Id. at 857.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 858.
297. Id. at 857.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 856.
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or evidence of such abuse by school personnel.”300 Further, the
University could reasonably “regard Oyama’s insistence that most
disabilities are feigned and that requiring high school teachers to
educate disabled students is unreasonable as indicators that he would
not make the effort to identify students with disabilities or adjust his
lessons for individual students whose disabilities require special
accommodations.”301
At least one question presented was whether the University’s position violated First Amendment guarantees.302 The court rejected that
the student speech doctrine, “standing alone, provides an adequate
framework for evaluating Oyama’s claim.”303 Instead, the court
created a hybrid test that drew from both school speech doctrine and
public-employee speech doctrine,304 reasoning that the latter doctrine
was applicable because “Oyama was a candidate for a certification
that would allow him to work as a public school teacher.”305
When discussing the school speech doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
noted that “in Morse, the Court allowed the suspension of a student
who held up a banner reading ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’ as the Olympic
torch passed by, reasoning that ‘schools may take steps to safeguard
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.’”306 After noting that the University had “an institutional responsibility . . . [to] limit certification
recommendations to individuals suitable to enter the teaching
profession,”307 the Ninth Circuit then reasoned that “[t]his
institutional responsibility, like the ‘governmental interest in stopping
student drug abuse’ in Morse, may allow the University to deny a
student teaching application based on speech demonstrating that the
applicant lacks the professional skills and disposition to enter a
classroom, even as a student teacher.”308
Yet, this analysis of Morse is, at best, incomplete. For example, in
his concurrence, Justice Alito said that Morse “provides no support
for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as

300. Id. at 871.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 860.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 861 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007)).
307. Id. at 862.
308. Id. (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408).
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commenting on any political or social issue,”309 and it is difficult not
to read Oyama’s comments as taking a position on a social issue.
Certainly, if an individual does something to demonstrate that he
cannot be a good teacher, then a university is justified in not
certifying him. But then the question is whether the comments in a
reflection piece about a video310 demonstrate that Oyama was
unqualified. Suppose, for example, that his teachers had glowing
reports about his performance in the classroom including an
appropriate sensitivity to the needs and vulnerabilities of his students.
Presumably, his comments would then not have demonstrated
anything.
The Ninth Circuit also discussed Kuhlmeier, which “recognizes a
school’s interest in managing how it ‘lend[s] its name’ or its ‘imprimatur’ to student expression.”311 The court noted that “[w]hen the University recommends a student for certification, it communicates to the
world that, in its view, that student is fit to practice the profession; as
a result, the University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it approves to teach.”312 The Oyama court then concluded that “[b]ecause
the certification process necessarily implicates the University’s ‘imprimatur,’ the University is entitled to deference in determining how
to ‘lend its name’ to certification candidates.”313 But this reading of
Kuhlmeier makes it very broad—a university might be understood to
be authorized to refuse to award degrees or, perhaps, revoke degrees314
if its current or former student expressed a view to which the
University did not wish to lend its imprimatur. After offering this
rather broad reading of the school speech exceptions, the Ninth
Circuit noted that “[t]his case presents no occasion to extend student
speech doctrine to the university setting.”315 The court’s discussion
was regrettable for two distinct reasons: (1) it might result in a
dilution of student speech rights in secondary schools, and (2) it
309. Morse, 551 U.S. at 442 (Alito, J., concurring).
310. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856 (discussing Oyama’s written reflection on a video
entitled “Growing Up Online” in which Oyama stated, “I even think that real
life child predation should be legal, provided that the child is consentual
[sic].”).
311. Id. at 862 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72
(1988)).
312. Id.
313. Id. (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272).
314. See supra note 275 (citing Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d
355, 359 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015) (“[Case Western
Reserve] University will revoke that degree if it wins.”).
315. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863.
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might mislead other courts into applying the Court’s student speech
jurisprudence in the University context, because the Oyama court
devoted some time to discussing that jurisprudence in the context of a
student dismissal from a university professional program.
The Oyama court next addressed the public-employee doctrine,
noting that the Second Circuit, in Melzer v. Board of Education of
City School District of City of New York,316 had upheld the
termination of a public school teacher after his association with North
American Man/Boy Love Association (“NAMBLA”) became public.317
The stated goal of NAMBLA is “to change the laws and attitudes
governing sexual activity between men and boys.”318 The Second
Circuit had not based its holding on a demonstrated incapacity to
teach319 or on any inappropriate behavior with students.320 Instead, the
teacher was fired in reaction to parent complaints when his NAMBLA
membership became known.321
The Oyama court also discussed the firing of a high school
counselor upheld by the Seventh Circuit in Craig v. Rich Township
High School District 227,322 when that counselor had written a book
advocating that women engage in promiscuous behavior before
marriage.323 The Seventh Circuit suggested that the School Board had
“reasonably predicted that [his book,] ‘It’s Her Fault[,]’ would
interfere with the learning environment” at the school,324 and that the
“[d]efendants’ interests in protecting the integrity of counseling
services at Rich Central dwarfed Craig’s interest in publishing.”325
After discussing these cases, the Ninth Circuit explained that,
“[h]owever useful public employee speech doctrine may appear, . . . it
cannot control our analysis of Oyama’s First Amendment claim,”326
316. 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
317. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865 (discussing Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189–192, 199).
318. Id.
319. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189 (“For his school activities and teaching he received
several commendations.”).
320. Id. (“[T]he record before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in any
illegal or inappropriate conduct at Bronx Science.”).
321. Id. at 191 (“Many of the 50 or 60 parents in attendance [at a parent
association meeting] expressed anger at Melzer’s NAMBLA affiliation. They
threatened to remove their children and conduct a sit-down strike at the
school if Melzer were allowed to return.”).
322. 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013).
323. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865 (citing Craig, 736 F.3d at 1114).
324. Craig, 736 F.3d at 1120.
325. Id.
326. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865–66.
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because “Oyama was not a government employee”327 and because
“public employee speech doctrine provides no basis for considering the
role of academic freedom at public universities.”328 The court noted
that “[a]s a student at the University of Hawaii, Oyama enjoyed
greater freedom to test his ideas, critique professional conventions,
and develop into a more mature professional than he would as a
government employee.”329 However, this is very confusing. The court
discusses a jurisprudence and then says that the jurisprudence is
inapplicable, which makes it difficult to understand why the court
bothered to offer that analysis at all.
The Oyama court looked at some of the school certification cases
as well, noting that “these decisions lack a common doctrinal foundation.”330 Nonetheless, those decisions seemed to support the rule
that “universities may consider students’ speech in making
certification decisions, so long as their decisions are based on defined
professional standards, and not on officials’ personal disagreement
with students’ views.”331 Thus, when offering its analysis, the Ninth
Circuit looked at the school speech cases, but then announced that
they were not applicable; looked at the public employee speech cases,
but then announced that they were not applicable; and then decided
for some reason that a hybrid of the two lines of cases provided the
appropriate test.332 The court then examined the school certification
cases, which did not provide a helpful standard except insofar as they
were in agreement that deference to “defined professional standards”333
was appropriate.
The Ninth Circuit said that “the University could look to what
Oyama said as an indication of what he would do once certified.”334 Of
course, Oyama did not say that he would have relations with
students. On the contrary, he said that he would report such relations
if they came to his attention.335 Nor did he say that he would not try
327. Id. at 866.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 867.
331. Id. at 867–68.
332. See id. at 860 (explaining that, because of “the mixed characteristics of
Oyama’s claim,” the court decided to apply both the public employee speech
and student speech doctrines).
333. Id. at 872.
334. Id. at 870 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)) (emphasis
added).
335. Id. at 856.
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to help every student, although he did suggest that “it is not
reasonable to expect secondary school teachers to have the ‘extremely
diverse skillset’ needed to teach the range of grade levels presented in
a mainstream classroom that includes students with learning
disabilities.”336 An individual should not be barred from teaching
merely because she suggests that there are significant challenges when
teaching students with very different abilities, and an individual who
may have had limited contact with children with special needs may
find that her past misconceptions, for example, that 90 percent are
fakers,337 are in fact misconceptions when she has met more students
with those needs. That said, the Ninth Circuit may well have been
correct in upholding the refusal to permit Oyama to do student
teaching because his performance in the classroom raised a number of
red flags indicating that he would not be a good teacher.338
Nonetheless, the court’s suggestion that “[i]n the context of a public
university’s professional certification program, the university may
evaluate the student’s speech, made in the course of the program, in
determining the student’s eligibility for certification without offending
the First Amendment under certain circumstances,”339 may well chill
much speech and give universities too much discretion. Further, if
students are on notice that their speech could be used against them
should the university decide to dismiss them from the program, then
the students will be incentivized to keep those views to themselves
rather than expose them to possible correction or modification by
airing them. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit may have been correct
to affirm the decision not to permit Oyama to do student teaching,
the court’s interpretation of the governing jurisprudence is likely to
have regrettable consequences.
D. Dismissals and Religious Convictions

Many
programs
deference,
reasons.340

of the cases involving student dismissals from professional
suggest that universities are afforded a great deal of
especially if a student has been dismissed for academic
However, less deference is sometimes given when students

336. Id. at 856–57.
337. Id. at 857.
338. Id. (“Oyama received an ‘unacceptable’ rating as to the ability to teach
effectively, work collaboratively with colleagues, respond to suggestions from
supervisors, and demonstrate the level of professionalism expected of middle
school teachers.”).
339. Id. at 876.
340. See supra notes 171–339 and accompanying text (discussing Tatro, Keefe, AlDabagh, and Oyama, in which the courts granted deference to universities in
making academic judgments regarding professionalism).
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claim to have conscientious objections to performing certain tasks,
although the analyses offered in at least some of these cases have not
been particularly persuasive.
At issue in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson341 was a requirement imposed
in the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program (“ATP”) that a
student engage in behaviors to which she had religious objections.342
When Christina Axson-Flynn auditioned for the ATP and was asked
“if there was anything she would feel uncomfortable doing or saying
as an actor,”343 she responded that “she would not remove her
clothing, ‘take the name of God in vain,’ ‘take the name of Christ in
vain’ or ‘say the four-letter expletive beginning with the letter F.’”344
At one point during the audition, Axson-Flynn allegedly said, “‘I
would rather not be admitted to your program than use these words’
and ‘I will not use these words.’”345
Axson-Flynn was admitted to the program.346 During the first
semester, she refused to utter the words that she found offensive even
if her assignments called for her to do so, and she nonetheless did
well.347 After the first semester, the faculty advised her to “get over”348
her reluctance to say those words because “not using the words would
stunt her growth as an actor.”349 Rather than overcome her aversion
to saying certain words, she voluntarily left the program, at least in
part because she assumed that she would eventually be forced out.350
That assumption was based on a conversation that she had with the
program director.351
341. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004).
342. See id. at 1280–82 (discussing the program’s requirement that Axson-Flynn
say the words “goddamn” and “fucking” as part of a class exercise and
Axson-Flynn’s refusal to say those words because of her religious beliefs).
343. Id. at 1281.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 356 F.3d at 1282 (“For the rest of the semester, Axson-Flynn was
allowed to omit any language she found offensive during class exercises.”)
(citing Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (D. Utah 2001),
rev’d, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004)).
348. Id. at 1280.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. See id. at 1282 (“Axson-Flynn went to Sandy Shotwell, the director of the
ATP. She said to Shotwell, ‘. . . If I do not—and this is what you said—
modify my values by the end of the semester, I’m going to have to find
another program. Is that right?’ Shotwell replied, ‘Well, yes.’”).
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Axson-Flynn filed suit against the University of Utah, claiming
that her being forced to say words to which she objected was
compelled speech in violation of her First Amendment speech rights
and her being compelled to say sinful words violated her free-exercise
rights.352 When analyzing the constitutional issues, the Tenth Circuit
began by discussing the Court’s school speech cases,353 noting that the
ATP classroom constitutes a nonpublic forum.354 The court explained
that it would “uphold the ATP’s decision to restrict (or compel) that
speech as long as the decision was ‘reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns,’”355 a very deferential approach. What were the
pedagogical concerns? (1) “[I]t teaches students how to step outside
their own values and character by forcing them to assume a very
foreign character and to recite offensive dialogue;”356 (2) “it teaches
students to preserve the integrity of the author’s work;”357 and (3) “it
measures true acting skills to be able convincingly to portray an
offensive part.”358
Presumably, there are numerous ways to teach students how to
step outside their own values and character, to preserve a work’s
integrity, and to convincingly portray an offensive part.359 But if that
is so, it might be thought surprising that a Program would insist that
Axson-Flynn be willing to utter certain words in particular. But the
court said it was not “second-guess[ing] the pedagogical wisdom or
efficacy of an educator’s goal.”360 That said, the court was willing to
“investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was
pretextual”361 and would “override an educator’s judgment where the
352. Id. at 1283.
353. See id. at 1284 (referencing the court’s application of Tinker and Hazlewood
to explain the First Amendment rights of students in public schools).
354. Id. at 1285.
355. Id. at 1290 (citing Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926
(10th Cir. 2002)).
356. Id. at 1291.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See Rebecca Metz, Acting: How Do Actors Prepare for Emotional and
Intense
Scenes
in
Movies?,
Quora
(Jan.
31,
2014),
https://www.quora.com/Acting-How-do-actors-prepare-for-emotional-andintense-scenes-in-movies [https://perma.cc/UMV6-RDER] (“Preparation for
an emotionally demanding scene is very personal, and varies with each actor
and scene or role. Some actors follow formal techniques, some have developed
modifications to these ‘pure’ approaches, and others have developed
techniques of their own.”).
360. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added).
361. Id. at 1293.
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proffered goal or methodology was a sham pretext for an
impermissible ulterior motive.”362
Axson-Flynn claimed that she was being forced to say offensive
words “because of ‘anti-Mormon sentiment.’”363 She supported that
contention in two ways:
1. During her deposition, Axson-Flynn had queried, “They
respect other kids’ freedom of religion that aren’t [Mormon].
Why won’t they respect mine?” Her example was that one
individual had been accommodated because he was not required
to come to class on a Holy Day.364
2. Axson-Flynn’s teachers had noted that other Mormons had
not objected to the requirement that they utter these offensive
words, and those teachers recommended that Axson-Flynn
speak to others sharing her faith to see if she could say these
words without violating her religious duties.365

Suppose that the Program had found from past experience that
not punishing a student who was absent one day because of a death
in the family, illness, or a religious holiday would not undermine that
student’s training as an actor but that a student’s refusal to ever say
particular lines would undermine that person’s training. Such a Program might permit an individual to be excused from class on Good
Friday, but might not permit her to refuse to utter words that might
be construed as taking the Lord’s name in vain.366 It would be difficult
to construe such a policy as anti-Catholic unless the very policy of
requiring a student to take the Lord’s name in vain was itself viewed
as manifesting animus towards any religion prohibiting such
utterances, even if there was a secular reason for such a rule.367
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 1298 (“[A] Jewish student named Jeremy Rische asked for and received
permission to avoid doing an improvisational exercise on Yom Kippur without
suffering adverse consequences.”).
365. See id. at 1293 (discussing the program’s insistence that “Axson-Flynn speak
with other ‘good Mormon girls’ and that she could ‘still be a good Mormon’
and say these words”).
366. See Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 U. Kan. L. Rev. 411,
411 n.2 (1994) (“[T]he Catholic church regards as sinful the taking of the
Lord’s name in vain . . . .”).
367. See Bradley C. Johnson, By Its Fruits Shall Ye Know; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson:
More Rotted Fruit from Employment Division v. Smith, 80 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 1287, 1309–10 (2005) (“[B]y joining a free exercise claim and a free speech
claim, the Smith hybrid rights exception should, in theory, be sufficient to
prevent a state from constitutionally compelling someone to swear without
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Certainly, Axson-Flynn might have objected to her teachers’
pointing to the views of “other ‘good Mormon girls’”368 and might
have sincerely felt that her religion precluded her from saying these
words even if others disagreed. Indeed, she might have cited Thomas
v. Review Board369 for support. Thomas involved a Jehovah’s Witness
who believed that he could not as a matter of conscience produce
weapons.370 A co-worker told Thomas that it was not “unscriptural”371
to help produce weapons, but Thomas disagreed. The Thomas Court
suggested that Thomas’s beliefs could not be second-guessed,372
making clear that “the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to
beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.”373
So too, Axson-Flynn’s beliefs should not have been second-guessed,
even if others of her faith had a different view. That said, however,
just as no evidence was cited in Thomas to establish that the Indiana
workers’ compensation board had an anti-Jehovah’s Witness bias
merely because it took seriously that other members of the faith did
not share Thomas’s view,374 the professors who noted that others of
Axson-Flynn’s faith had a different view did not thereby indicate
animus.
Might there have been animus behind the insistence that AxsonFlynn utter words that she found religiously offensive? Perhaps. But

having to modify or overrule Smith.”); see also Ryan S. Rummage, In
Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious Liberty, 64 Emory L.J.
1175, 1220 (2015) (“Because there was a valid hybrid rights claim, the court
would then balance the interests of both Axson-Flynn and the public university
under the strict scrutiny standard . . . .”).
368. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293 (discussing how the program’s words
certainly could raise “concern that hostility to her faith rather than a
pedagogical interest in her growth as an actress was at stake in Defendants’
behavior in this case.”).
369. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
370. Id. at 710 (“[H]e quit, asserting that he could not work on weapons without
violating the principles of his religion.”).
371. Id. at 711.
372. Id. at 715 (“Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew
was an unreasonable one.”).
373. Id. at 715–16.
374. See id. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[I]t cannot be said that the State
discriminated against Thomas on the basis of his religious beliefs or that he was
denied benefits because he was a Jehovah’s Witness.”).
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the evidence cited does not suggest animus and, indeed, there was evidence to the contrary.375
When analyzing whether free exercise guarantees had been
violated, the Tenth Circuit noted that “[n]eutral rules of general
applicability ordinarily do not raise free exercise concerns even if they
incidentally burden a particular religious practice or belief.”376 But the
court explained that “[a] rule that is discriminatorily motivated and
applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability.”377 Because there
allegedly was a “genuine issue of fact in the record as to whether
Defendants’ requirement of script adherence was pretextual,”378 the
court remanded the case to determine “whether the script adherence
requirement was discriminatorily applied to religious conduct (and
thus was not generally applicable).”379 The court warned that “[u]nless
Defendants succeed in showing that the script requirement was a
neutral rule of general applicability, they will face the daunting task
of establishing that the requirement was narrowly tailored to advance
a compelling governmental interest.”380
Suppose that the University had indeed applied its rule in a
neutral and generally applicable way. A separate issue is whether an
individual exemption should have been offered. The court noted that
the University sometimes granted exemptions, stating that “a Jewish
student named Jeremy Rische asked for and received permission to
avoid doing an improvisational exercise on Yom Kippur without
suffering adverse consequences.”381 The court’s description is
informative:
Defendant Barbara Smith, who taught First Year Acting, gave
him this exemption despite the fact that, in Rische’s words, “she
said it would be an exercise that couldn’t be made up, because
it was one of the exercises by—an improv exercise that involved

375. See infra note 386 and accompanying text (noting that Axson-Flynn’s
professors previously had exempted her from the script adherence
requirements).
376. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Church
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993);
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)).
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1298.
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the whole class, and it would be almost impossible to make
up.”382

This was a group exercise, so there would be no way for Rische to
come in at a different time to make up the class. Because Rische suffered no diminution in grade, the court implied that he was receiving
preferential treatment. There was no discussion of how other students
were treated if they missed one class that could not be made up; for
example, whether someone who was gravely ill on an improv day
would have her grade lowered.
It was not as if this student would never participate in improv
exercises—he simply would not do this on a particular Holy Day.383 So
too, an individual might refuse to attend class on a Holy Day of
Obligation,384 but might be willing to perform all of the required exercises on other days. Axson-Flynn was not merely saying that she
could not do the required performance on a particular day—she was
never willing to perform the exercises at issue.
Ironically, the court noted a different example in which a student
had been afforded an exemption—Axson-Flynn herself had been exempted from an exercise.385 Because of that, the court wondered
whether there was a “system of individualized exemptions,”386 even
though there were no policies exempting anyone on the basis of
religion.387

382. Id.
383. Regrettably, some commentators do not see the importance of differentiating
between the contents of the exemptions. See Nicholas M. Gaunce & Robert
Luther III, Deliver Us from Evil: Why Bankruptcy Judges May Properly Rely
on the Free Exercise Clause & RFRA to Protect Church Property from the
Grasps of Tort-Creditors, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 641, 654 (2009) (“In
addressing her claim, the court considered the application of the
individualized exemption doctrine to the ATP. Specifically, it found that
instructors in the program had previously granted exemptions from specific
scenes to Axson-Flynn and another student on religious grounds.”).
384. Cf. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 62–63 (1986) (“The tenets
of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during
designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss
approximately six schooldays each year.”).
385. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1299 (“Defendants sometimes granted AxsonFlynn herself an exemption from their script adherence requirement . . . .”).
386. Id.
387. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1334 (D. Utah 2001),
rev’d, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiff has pointed to no reference in
curricular policy, guidelines or course descriptions themselves where a system
of exemptions are extended to students for religious or other reasons.”).
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Two points might be made about this individualized exception
discussion. First, there was scant evidence of a policy of individualized
exemptions—the only two who had received such exemptions were
Rische and Axson-Flynn, herself. Second, if the fact that Rische was
permitted to miss class without incurring a punishment indicated
favoritism, then the fact that Axson-Flynn was allowed to avoid
saying certain words during the first semester without incurring
punishment would seem to indicate favoritism rather than unfavorable
treatment. By the same token, her having been excempted from the
general rules during the first semester hardly indicates anti-Mormon
bias.
At the very least, the Axson-Flynn court is sending mixed
messages. The court hints that the requirement that individuals speak
the lines written is pretextual because (1) a different individual had
been excused from attending class on a Holy Day, and (2) AxsonFlynn herself had received an exemption from being required to speak
the lines one semester but not the next. But if that is enough to
justify a remand for a finding of pretextual action, courts will be very
busy indeed.388 Further, if permitting individuals to miss class on a
Holy Day without punishment means that all religious beliefs must be
accommodated, then public schools will either have to make no
allowances389 or they will have to make many allowances.390 For
example, would a school excusing attendance on a religious holiday be
forced to have segregated classes if an individual was forbidden from
being in close physical proximity to someone of a different sex who
was not the person’s spouse?391
388. See Edgar Dyer, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson: Will Students or Institutions
Control Curriculum and Pedagogy at Public Universities in the U.S. Tenth
Circuit?, 196 Ed. L. Rep. 745, 752 (2005) (“The Tenth Circuit was surely
dissembling when it noted that the religious nature of Axson-Flynn’s claims
had no bearing on their holding, because any such allegations in the Tenth
Circuit with even specious claims of religious discrimination must now be
played out before a jury.”).
389. Johnson, supra note 367, at 1314 (“If the government does not create a system
of individualized exemptions, the exception is wholly unavailable.”).
390. Cf. Dyer, supra note 388, at 751 (“[Axson-Flynn] has established a precedent in
the Tenth Circuit for students to use their religion as a pretext for not
complying with the course requirements in any particular class.”).
391. Cf. Michael Paulson, When a Plane Seat Next to a Woman Is Against Orthodox
Faith, N.Y. Times (April 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/
10/us/aboard-flights-conflicts-over-seat-assignments-and-religion.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/L5QY-UJUL] (“Francesca Hogi, 40, had settled into her aisle
seat for the flight from New York to London when the man assigned to the
adjoining window seat arrived and refused to sit down. He said his religion
prevented him from sitting beside a woman who was not his wife.”).
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The difficulties for universities that are suggested by the AxsonFlynn approach are amplified when one considers how many views
might qualify as religious. Watts v. Florida International University392
illustrates this point. At issue in Watts was the dismissal of John
Watts from a practicum and then from a degree program at Florida
International University (“FIU”).393
Watts was enrolled in a Masters of Social Work program at
FIU.394 Part of his coursework included a practicum. As part of the
practicum, he was counseling a patient who lacked a diagnosis.395
After talking to her, he recommended that she “join a bereavement
support group.”396 She “asked where she could find such a group.”397
Watts noticed that she self-described as Catholic, and he included a
church among the possible places that she could go.398
He was dismissed from the program using the Pickering test399
because of his alleged “inappropriate behavior related to patients, regarding religion.”400 The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[t]he Pickering decision recognized that government ‘has interests as an employer
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the
citizenry in general.’”401 But Watts had paid his tuition and was doing
the practicum as part of his coursework,402 so it was not clear why he
should be treated as a government employee.403
392. 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007).
393. Id. at 1291.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 1292.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. See id. at 1294 (“[J]udged under Pickering, the termination of Watts from the
practicum because of what he said during the private counseling session does
not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”).
400. Id. at 1292.
401. Id. at 1293 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
402. See id. at 1292 (“Watts registered for the course, paid his tuition, and was
assigned to Fair Oaks Hospital, a private psychiatric institution affiliated with
FIU for purposes of the practicum.”); see also Neal H. Hutchens et al.,
Employee or Student?: The First Amendment and Student Speech Arising in
Practica and Internships, 306 Ed. L. Rep. 597, 601 (2014) (“Students enrolled
in the practicum were required to register for course hours and pay tuition.”).
403. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (explaining that Oyama was not an
employee and hence his speech claim should not be evaluated in light of the
government employee speech jurisprudence).
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The Eleventh Circuit then explained that Watts “pleaded a valid
First Amendment free exercise of religion claim.”404 Watts was not a
Catholic.405 Nonetheless, he claimed to have the religious belief that “a
patient who professes a religion is entitled to be informed if the
counselor is aware of a religious avenue within the patient’s religion
that will meet the appropriate therapy protocol for the patient.”406
The issue then became whether Watts’ sincere belief was itself
religious. The Watts court explained: “Our dissenting colleague
acknowledges that Watts has adequately pleaded the sincerity of his
belief, but believes that he has failed to plead sufficiently that the
belief is of a religious character.”407 However, the majority disagreed,
in part because it was not sure how one could show that a particular
belief was itself religious.408 But if that is so, then any sincerely held
beliefs will have to count as religious if an individual says that they
are,409 as long as the individual cannot be shown to be lying about his
own view as to whether they are religious.410
A separate question is whether an individual is compelled by
those religious beliefs to act in a particular way. The Watts court
suggested that Watts would have to “plead that he believes his
religion compels him to take the actions that resulted in his
termination.”411 Yet, that may be overstating the requirement—it
would be surprising if an individual could not be terminated for

404. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1294.
405. See id. at 1296 (quoting Amended Complaint at 8, Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ.,
No. 02-60199-CIV, 2005 WL 3730879 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2005)) (“Mr. Watts is
a Christian. He is not Catholic.”).
406. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 8, Watts, No. 02-60199-CIV, 2005 WL
3730879).
407. Id. (citing id. at 1301 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)).
408. See id. at 1296 (“[W]e question whether a plaintiff could ever plead or proffer
‘objective’ facts that his particular sincerely held belief is religious in nature.
Religion is by its nature subjective.”).
409. In interpreting a federal statute, the Seeger Court considered the role played
by particular beliefs when deciding whether they counted as religious. See
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (“We think it clear that the
beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the
belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.”). It is
simply unclear whether the role played by the beliefs is an additional criterion
for constitutional purposes.
410. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1298 (“The question is not whether the plaintiff’s beliefs are
religious in the objective, reasonable person’s view, but whether they are
religious in the subjective, personal view of the plaintiff.”).
411. Id. at 1297.
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performing legal actions required by his religion,412 but could be
terminated for performing legal actions strongly encouraged but not
required by his religion.
Certainly, a court does not get to reject religious beliefs merely
because it does not agree with them.413 Nonetheless, combining the
views suggested in Watts and Axson-Flynn might prove very challenging for any university whose professional program involved requirements that might seem to be in conflict with any religious views.
Another case out of the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how such a
conflict might be handled.
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley414 involved Jennifer Keeton, a student
in a degree program at Augusta State University to obtain a master’s
degree in school counseling.415 After she completed her first year in the
program, she was asked to “participate in a remediation plan
addressing what the faculty perceived as deficiencies in her ability to
be a multiculturally competent counselor, particularly with regard to
working
with
gay,
lesbian,
bisexual,
transgender,
and
queer/questioning (GLBTQ) populations.”416 Keeton had a number of
beliefs regarding sexual orientation “arising from her Christian
faith.”417 For example, she “believed that the GLBTQ population
suffers from identity confusion, and . . . she intended to attempt to
convert students from being homosexual to heterosexual.”418
Keeton alleged that “officials told her that ‘you couldn’t be a
teacher, let alone a counselor, with those views,’ asked her to alter
some of her beliefs, and said that she had a choice of adhering to the
Bible or to the ACA Code of Ethics.”419 However, the officials denied
making those statements, and instead “testified that they never told
412. See Emp’t Div v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (“Even if we were inclined
to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation
field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable
criminal law.”).
413. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714
(1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”).
414. 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011).
415. See id. at 867 (addressing Keeton’s request for a preliminary injunction to keep
the university from dismissing her from the degree program should she fail to
complete a plan addressing her inability to work successfully with GLBTQ
individuals).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 868.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 870.
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her that she needed to alter her beliefs or that her beliefs were wrong
or unethical, and that she could continue to maintain her personal religious beliefs and still become an effective counselor.”420 Further, students had testified that “professors told Keeton in class that she did
not need to change her beliefs, but instead needed to be aware of her
beliefs and not impose them on the client.”421
The American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) Code of Ethics
included the following:
(1) Section A.1.a: “The primary responsibility of counselors is to
respect the dignity and to promote the welfare of clients”;
(2) Section A.4.b: “Counselors are aware of their own values,
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and avoid imposing values that
are inconsistent with counseling goals. Counselors respect the
diversity of clients, trainees, and research participants”;
(3) Section C.2.a: “Counselors gain knowledge, personal
awareness, sensitivity, and skills pertinent to working with a
diverse client population”; and
(4) Section C.5: “Counselors do not condone or engage in
discrimination based on age, culture, disability, ethnicity, race,
religion/spirituality, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation,
marital status/partnership, language preference, socioeconomic
status, or any basis proscribed by law.”422

The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “if ASU’s officials imposed
the remediation plan because of Keeton’s personal religious views on
homosexuality, it is presumed that they violated her constitutional
rights.”423 However, the court rejected that remediation had been
imposed because of her views, instead suggesting that “the evidence
shows that the remediation plan was imposed because she expressed
an intent to impose her personal religious views on her clients, in
violation of the ACA Code of Ethics, and that the objective of the
remediation plan was to teach her how to effectively counsel GLBTQ
clients in accordance with the ACA Code of Ethics.”424
Keeton had explained that “as a high school counselor confronted
by a sophomore student in crisis, questioning his sexual orientation,
420. Id.
421. Id. at 872.
422. Id. at 869 (quoting ACA Code of Ethics §§ A.1.a, A.4.b, C.2.a, C.5 (Am.
Counseling Ass’n 2014)).
423. Id. at 872.
424. Id.
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she would tell the student that it was not okay to be gay.”425 Keeton
had told another student that “if a client discloses that he is gay, it
was her intention to tell the client that his behavior is morally wrong
and then try to change the client’s behavior, and if she were unable to
help the client change his behavior, she would refer him to someone
practicing conversion therapy.”426
But Keeton’s announced intentions were not in accord the ACA’s
“fundamental principles, including that counselors must support their
clients’ welfare, promote their growth, respect their dignity, support
their autonomy, and help them pursue their own goals for counseling.”427 Further, the school’s “curriculum requires that all students be
competent to work with all populations, and that all students not impose their personal religious values on their clients, whether, for instance, they believe that persons ought to be Christians rather than
Muslims, Jews or atheists, or that homosexuality is moral or immoral.”428
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “ASU has conditioned
participation in the clinical practicum and graduation on compliance
with the ACA Code of Ethics.”429 But Augusta State University did
not arbitrarily decide to condition graduation on compliance with that
Code. On the contrary, “ASU must adopt and follow the ACA Code
of Ethics in order to offer an accredited program.”430 Because Keeton
“voluntarily enrolled in the program, [she] does not have a
constitutional right to refuse to comply with those conditions.”431
The court rejected that ASU forced “Keeton to profess a belief
contrary to her own personal beliefs.”432 Instead, “the ACA Code of
Ethics . . . requires those who wish to be counselors to separate their
personal beliefs from their work.”433 Suppose, for example, that a student seeks moral validation of a behavior that the counselor does not
believe morally permissible. “When a GLBTQ client asks, for
example, if his conduct is moral, students are taught to avoid giving
advice, to explore the issue with the client, and to help the client

425. Id. at 868.
426. Id. at 869.
427. Id. at 874.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 878.
430. Id. at 876.
431. Id. at 878.
432. Id.
433. Id.
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determine for himself what the answer is for him.”434 The ACA Code
of Ethics does not require a counselor to adopt the patient’s view as
her own—“the ACA Code of Ethics requires the counselor to affirm
the client, which means that the counselor must respect the dignity of
the client by accepting the client’s response without judgment, not
that the counselor must say that she personally believes that the
client is correct.”435
While the Keeton court suggested that Keeton’s announced intention to try to dissuade individuals with a same-sex orientation from
living that “lifestyle”436 and to refer someone for “conversion
therapy,”437 involved her intention to “impose her personal religious
views on her clients,”438 the Keeton decision cannot plausibly be read
to suggest that Keeton would have been acting in accord with the
Code of Ethics had she instead said that she would simply refuse to
counsel any GLBTQ students.439 The Code “requires the counselor to
affirm the client,”440 although the counselor is not required to “say
that she personally believes that the client is correct.”441 Regrettably,
the Sixth Circuit offered an interpretation of Keeton that was at best
implausible.
Ward v. Polite442 involved a challenge by Julea Ward to her
expulsion from a counseling program at Eastern Michigan
University.443 During her three years in the program, Ward frequently
said that her religious beliefs precluded her from affirming the value of
same-sex relationships or the value of certain non-marital

434. Id. at 878–79.
435. Id. at 879.
436. Id. at 868.
437. Id. at 869.
438. Id. at 872.
439. But see Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Instead of
insisting on changing her clients, Ward asked only that the university not
change her—that it permit her to refer some clients in some settings.”); Curtis
Schube, Catch 22: The Rising Concern of Faith Being Removed from
Counseling and the First Amendment Concerns Associated, 35 N. Ill. U. L.
Rev. 375, 384 (2015) (“Where Ward differs from Keeton is that Ward did
not impose values, but rather just wanted to not counsel the client at all.”).
440. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 879.
441. Id.
442. 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012)
443. Id. at 729–32 (stating Ward’s assertion that her expulsion violated her First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
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relationships.444 But that presented a potential difficulty, both because
of national nondiscrimination standards and because of a university
policy requiring counselors to be supportive of their clients.
Part of her coursework included a practicum.445 During the
practicum, students spent at least forty hours counseling multiple clients.446 Ward counseled two individuals without incident.447 However,
when she was reviewing the file of the third individual, “she noticed
he sought counseling about a same-sex relationship.”448 She then
sought advice from her counselor—she was not sure whether it would
be better to refer the individual from the beginning or wait to refer
until it became clear that she would have to affirm the individual’s
relationship.449 After Ward decided to refer the individual, the
University began a disciplinary hearing and eventually expelled her
from the program.450 Ward challenged the expulsion as a violation of
First Amendment guarantees.451
The Sixth Circuit noted that there was no written policy
preventing students from referring patients to others.452
Notwithstanding “the university’s claim that a no-referral policy
existed for the practicum class, supported by the testimony of several
professors and administrators, and in view of the reality that the
purported policy arises in the context of a university’s curriculum and
its counseling services,”453 the Sixth Circuit believed that that was
ample authority to believe “that no such policy existed.”454 After all,
444. See id. at 729 (“In three years with the program, Julea Ward frequently
expressed a conviction that her faith (Christianity) prevented her from
affirming a client’s same-sex relationships as well as certain heterosexual
conduct, such as extra-marital relationships.”).
445. See id. at 730 (“[S]he enrolled in a counseling practicum, a graduation
prerequisite that requires students to apply what they have learned through
one-on-one counseling sessions with real clients.”).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 730–31.
449. Id. at 731.
450. See id. at 730.
451. See id. at 732 (“Her expulsion from the program, she claimed, violated her
free-speech and free-exercise rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.”).
452. See id. at 739 (“The university defendants, as shown, cannot point to any
written policy that barred Ward from requesting this referral.”).
453. Id. at 740.
454. Id. at 739 (“Ample evidence supports the theory that no such policy existed—
until Ward asked for a referral on faith-based grounds.”).
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the court noted, the school permitted students to refer clients “for
additional counseling services outside the Counseling Clinic.”455 But
merely because a student is permitted to refer someone for additional
counseling, it can hardly be thought to justify offering no counseling
and instead telling an individual to go somewhere else, especially if
one of the prime directives of the ACA policy “is to respect the
dignity and to promote the welfare of clients.”456
The Ward court offered an additional example in which a referral
had been permitted. There was “one instance . . . when the school
permitted a practicum referral, allowing a grieving student to refrain
from counseling a grieving client.”457 The University described this as
a single incident rather than a policy,458 but the court was confident
that this example “calls into question the basis for the university’s
actions.”459 After all, the fact that “the counseling department was
willing to avoid unsuitable student-client matches in some
instances”460 made the court wonder why Ward was treated
differently.461 However, the grieving student was not saying that she
would never help someone who was grieving; instead, that student
was saying that she simply could not offer such counseling at that
time. Unlike the grieving student, Ward was not merely saying that
she could not counsel a gay student on this occasion because of some
temporary affliction that Ward, herself, was suffering.
To support the position that the University was engaging in
wrongdoing, the Ward court noted: “The school permits students to
request certain types of clients to counsel—what you might call a yesreferral policy—and the school will honor the request.”462 This seemed
to be a problem. “Why a school would honor student requests to
counsel clients with certain types of problems but refuse requests not
to counsel clients with certain types of problems is not self-evident.”463
Yet, students who can be especially helpful for certain kinds of clients
should be permitted to assist those clients, since those students would
455. Id. at 736.
456. See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (quoting ACA Code of Ethics § A.1.a (Am.
Counseling Ass’n 2014)).
457. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added).
458. Id. (“The university demurs, claiming this was not a ‘referral’ but a ‘single
incident of non-assignment.’”).
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 736.
463. Id. at 736–37.
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be fulfilling ACA goals of affirming each client. But someone who
refuses to counsel a client because of her disapproval of that client is
not acting in accord with the universal affirmation policy of ACA.
Perhaps the Ward court simply believed that the ACA policy was
wrongheaded. The court wrote:
Surely, for example, the ban on discrimination against clients
based on their religion (1) does not require a Muslim counselor
to tell a Jewish client that his religious beliefs are correct if the
conversation takes a turn in that direction and (2) does not
require an atheist counselor to tell a person of faith that there is
a God if the client is wrestling with faith-based issues. Tolerance
is a two-way street.464

The court is correct that individuals are not required to affirm the
truth of the religious views or other faiths. But, as the Keeton court
explained, the ACA “requires the counselor to affirm the client,” even
if the counselor does not subscribe to the client’s beliefs.465 The Sixth
Circuit’s position went much further. One infers that the Sixth
Circuit would say that just as Ward should be allowed to refer a
GLBTQ person rather than offer that person counseling, an individual
with conscientious objections to counseling someone of another
religion should be allowed to refer that person rather than offer
counseling. But this is exactly the kind of approach that the ACA
principles are designed to preclude.
Permitting referrals as a general matter might not impose too
great a burden on a client if there were relatively few who would
invoke that privilege and if there were always enough counselors to
take care of the needs of the clients. Even were that so, such a policy
would seriously undermine the ACA principles. However, matters
would be even worse if there weren’t enough counselors to provide
needed services to disfavored communities.
Apparently, Ward had said that she could set aside certain
religious values but not others. “Ward said that she could ‘set aside
her religious values’ and counsel clients about things such as
‘abortion, child abuse, and murder’ but ‘could not set aside her
religious values in order to effectively counsel non-heterosexual
clients.’”466 But if she was distinguishing between the way that she
would approach cases involving same-sex relationships from those
implicating issues involving “abortion, child abuse, and murder” in
that she could not affirm those in the former group, then she seemed
464. Id. at 735.
465. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 879 (11th Cir. 2011).
466. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737.
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to be saying that she could be affirming of those in the latter group.
Perhaps she was saying that she could counsel the latter group, even
though she would not be affirming abortion, child abuse, or murder.
But that was what she was being asked to do with “non-heterosexual
clients,”467 namely, support those clients even if not personally
endorsing their relationships.
Ward denied that she was discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation. “She had no problem counseling gay and lesbian clients,
so long as the university did not require her to affirm their sexual
orientation.”468 Nevertheless, her teachers suspected that she was
discriminating on the basis of orientation,469 itself prohibited by ACA
rules,470 which is why they were exploring why she could set aside her
religious values and counsel those who had abortions or who had
committed child abuse or murder but she could not do so for GLBTQ
clients.
The Ward court characterized the teachers as “suggest[ing] a
distinction between secular values and spiritual ones, with a
preference for the former over the latter.”471 But this is simply wrong.
The teachers were trying to figure out why religious values were being
invoked in one case and not the other. That teachers were trying to
figure out what Ward was saying or doing does not establish that
those teachers had a pretextual dislike of religious values as a general
matter or even of Ward’s religious values in particular.
Was Ward being punished for her views? Perhaps. But the Ward
court seemed almost willfully blind to non-invidious explanations of
the University’s practices and seemed to ignore the very Code that
governed the accreditation of this Program. The court claimed to be
applying the same reasoning as was found in Keeton, but offered an
account of that decision that turned the decision on its head. The
court’s specious reasoning raised more questions about its own
approach than that of Eastern Michigan University.
In Ward, the Sixth Circuit was anything but deferential; in AlDabagh it was extremely deferential. How much deference should be
accorded to universities or professional standards? Both universities

467. Id.
468. Id. at 731.
469. See id. at 737 (“[Professor Duggar] offered her ‘professional opinion’ that
Ward was ‘selectively using her religious beliefs in order to rationalize her
discrimination against one group of people.’”).
470. See supra note 422 and accompanying text (discussing § C.5 of the ACA
Code of Ethics).
471. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737.
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and students might have some difficulty answering that question
when considering some of the recent circuit decisions.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence is unclear
about the extent to which it protects high school students’ First
Amendment rights, which itself is a matter of concern. One additional
concern is that courts cannot agree about whether the student-speech
jurisprudence applies in the university context. Courts simply do not
know what standard to use when judging whether dismissals of
university students from professional programs pass muster, which
means that relevantly similar cases will be decided in light of different
First Amendment tests depending upon the circuit.
Not only is there no agreement about the correct principle, but
the courts cannot even agree about whether to be deferential to
universities. Instead, courts are sometimes extremely deferential to
university decision-making and at other times view university policies
and practices with a jaundiced eye.
It is simply unclear whether universities must adopt written,
exception-less policies even when doing so would undermine legitimate
pedagogical goals, or, instead, will be afforded flexibility. Some of the
recent decisions suggest the following approach—universities will be
given great deference unless their policy contradicts sincere religious
beliefs, in which case the policy will be carefully scrutinized. But such
a policy invites individuals with sincere beliefs to categorize them as
religious, which would entitle those beliefs to much deference.
The current approach to student dismissals from professional programs is unsustainable. The Court must offer guidance about which
principle should be applied, how it should be applied, and what universities must do when their policies are not in accord with a
student’s religious beliefs. Having offered little to no guidance on
these matters, the Court has almost guaranteed inconsistent
application across the Circuits. The ever-increasing confusion in the
circuits suggests that this will be a growing problem unless the Court
clarifies these matters.
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